

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

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LUDWIG-MAXIMILIANS-UNIVERSITÄT
MÜNCHEN

— IV —

William Petropulos

The Person as ‘Imago Dei’
Augustine and Max Scheler in Eric Voegelin’s
‘Herrschaftslehre’ and ‘The Political Religions’



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OCCASIONAL PAPERS, IV, Juni 1997,
2. überarbeitete Auflage Juni 2000

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OCCASIONAL PAPERS
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Redaktion: Marc Schattenmann, Sebastian Brökelmann

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ISSN 1430-6786
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WILLIAM PETROPULOS

THE PERSON AS 'IMAGO DEI'

AUGUSTINE AND MAX SCHELER IN ERIC VOEGELIN'S
'HERRSCHAFTSLEHRE' AND 'THE POLITICAL RELIGIONS'¹

I.

Eric Voegelin and Max Scheler

As far as we know Eric Voegelin and Max Scheler never met, nor is there evidence that an exchange of letters took place. Eric Voegelin's study of Max Scheler occurred primarily in the early 1930's, several years after Max Scheler's death in 1928 at the age of fifty-four. In Voegelin's later writings one only finds isolated references to him. In the correspondence with Alfred Schütz the German philosopher is occasionally mentioned. Nevertheless, even the sparse text references to Scheler in Voegelin's late works are to issues which are vital to Voegelin's understanding of human existence.²

In the nineteen-thirties Voegelin was concerned with two phases of Max Scheler's philosophy. In *Rasse und Staat* (1933) he focuses on the, at that time in Germany, much

¹ This article is expanded from the paper presented in German at the „Second International Eric Voegelin Symposium“, 9-10 December 1993, Geschwister-Scholl-Institut für Politische Wissenschaft der Universität München. The original German of the longer quotations from works of Eric Voegelin and Max Scheler will be found in the footnotes.

² Compare „On Debate and Existence“ (1967) where Voegelin refers to Max Scheler's distinction between person-peripheral and person-central areas of the human being. Now in: *Collected Essays 1965-1985*, edited by Ellis Sandoz, vol. 12, *The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), pp. 36-51. Here p. 36.

discussed theme of „philosophical anthropology“. Arguing against the contemporary theories of race, Voegelin points out that they are based on primitive scientific prejudices which render them incapable of dealing with the spiritual dimension of man. In this context he turns to philosophical anthropology as a prophylactic against scientific primitivism. The principal question concerning the nature of the human being, he asserts, leads beyond the scope of an approach rooted in natural science with its naive assumptions concerning being.

Although Voegelin does not comment on the validity of the various philosophical anthropologies which he briefly touches upon, he expresses his preference for those forms which treat of basic spiritual experiences. He quotes Max Scheler on the „person“ as the spiritual source of the unity of the human being, but he does not enter into a discussion of how this spiritual center is organized. Instead he remarks: „Here is not the place to develop a philosophy of spirit“ (Geist).³ And indeed one must conclude that Voegelin’s mention of Max Scheler in *Rasse und Staat* does not constitute an examination of the latter’s philosophical anthropology, for the question of the truth of Max Scheler’s position is not raised.

In *Rasse und Staat* Voegelin explicitly refers to only one of Scheler’s works, the small, programmatic work, concluded shortly before his death, *Man’s Place in the Cosmos* (1928).⁴

³ Eric Voegelin, *Rasse und Staat*, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1933, p. 33; *Race and State*, translated by Klaus Vondung. Vol. 2, *Collected Works of Eric Voegelin* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, forthcoming 1997).

⁴ Max Scheler, *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*, vol. 9, *Gesammelte Werke* (Zürich and Munich: Francke Verlag, 1976); *Man’s Place in the Cosmos*, translated by Hans Meyerhoff (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1981).

On the other hand, the unfinished *Herrschaftslehre* (Theory of Domination) on which Voegelin worked between 1930 and 1932, is concerned with issues found in Max Scheler's „theistic phase“.⁵ In these writings Max Scheler explicated the ground of being as a personal God and humankind as *imago Dei*. The important works in this period are *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (1913-1916), *Vom Umsturz der Werte* (1915), *Vom Ewigen im Menschen* (1921), and *Vom Wesen der Sympathie* (2nd. ed.1923, expanded).⁶

The study of Scheler in the *Herrschaftslehre* takes place in the context of a philosophical self-reflection on „meditation as the basic form of philosophizing“. This primary mode of philosophizing remained of the greatest importance to Voegelin. On the other hand, philosophical anthropology became less important to him. In this matter he expressed his judgement conclusively in 1957:

„At the border of transcendence the language of philosophical anthropology must become the language of religious symbolization“.⁷

⁵ For a description of the phases of Max Scheler's philosophy see: I. M. Bochenski, „Max Scheler“, *Europäische Philosophie der Gegenwart*, 2nd ed., (Munich: Lehnen, 1951) pp. 150-163; *Contemporary European Philosophy*, translated by Donald Nicholl and Karl Aschenbrenner (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1956), pp. 161-175.

⁶ Max Scheler: *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, vol. 2, *Gesammelte Werke* (Zürich and Munich: Francke Verlag, 1954); *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, vol. 3, *Gesammelte Werke* (1955); *Vom Wesen der Sympathie*, vol. 7, *Gesammelte Werke*, (1957); *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, vol. 5, *Gesammelte Werke*, (1954). Quotations in the text from *Vom Ewigen im Menschen* are from: Max Scheler, *On The Eternal In Man*, translated by Bernard Noble, London: SCM Press, 1960. Cited in parentheses as *E.*, followed by the page number: thus (*E.*, 5).

⁷ Eric Voegelin, *Plato and Aristotle*, vol. 3, *Order and History*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), p. 363.

A description of humankind expressed in concepts, he concluded, can lead to the false expectation that mere discursive reason can adequately describe what a human being „is“. Voegelin's later view of the diminished importance of philosophical anthropology is consistent with the insights communicated in Max Scheler's philosophy of religion. Scheler held that the human being is at the center of his person an *ens amans* and the noetic acts which are subsumed under this term, foremost the *amor Dei*, cannot be reified into concepts. A spiritual act is only understandable by one who, in his own thought, reenacts the spiritual movement of that act, thereby performing the act for himself. The conditions for such an understanding are not merely qualities of intellect, but of the entire person. Thus, according to Scheler, Plato's description of the *ordo amoris* necessary for noetic understanding remains conclusive for all time:

„We may define the nature of the mental attitude which underlies all philosophical thinking as: a love-determined movement of the inmost personal Self of a finite being toward participation in the essential reality of all possibles“. (E. 74).

„[The] Platonic requirement that in philosophy the whole man, not only in his isolated intellect or isolated sensibility, etc., should seek participation in Reality is ... a requirement whose basis is neither psychological, nor purely epistemological, but *ontic*“ (E., 90-91).

Voegelin's reading of Max Scheler in the *Herrschaftslehre* is intimately involved with his reception of the thought of St. Augustine. Without suggesting that Voegelin was introduced to Augustine's thought by Scheler – there is no evidence for this assumption – there are nevertheless adequate objective reasons why he would examine both Augustine and Scheler in a work which had at its center the presentation of the human person. There were at least two aspects of Voegelin's

intellectual development up to 1930, which would make this reception a logical continuation of his thought:

- His training in a sociology rooted in the Fichtean reception of Kant's Critique of Practical Reason.
- His familiarity with the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and his associates.

To these two aspects, and their consequences for Voegelin's reception of Scheler's work, we now turn.

a) Sociological training

Voegelin trained as a sociologist under Othmar Spann,⁸ who taught that the essence of community is spirituality (das Geistige). The „pairing“ or „communing“ (Gezweigung) which is constitutive of such institutions as the family, art, science, commerce, the state etc. is a process in which individuals, awakened by spiritual acts and responding with their own, deepen and develop together toward personhood. The member of a family, for example, is not a *homo naturalis* who just also happens to find himself in a family; what a parent „is“, what a child „is“, only exists in the Gezweigung, „family“.⁹

In Spann's sociology the various institutions, viewed in themselves, may be seen as „totalities“ (Ganzheiten), for they

⁸ In 1934 Voegelin spoke of himself as a „student of Othmar Spann“. See Dirk Käsler, *Soziologische Abenteuer: Earle Edward Eubank besucht europäische Soziologen im Sommer 1934*, (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1985), pp. 142-147.

⁹ See: Othmar Spann, *Gesellschaftslehre* (Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1923), pp. 95-96; *Gesellschaftslehre*, vol. 4, *Othmar Spann Gesamtausgabe*, edited by Walter Heinrich *et. al.* (Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1969), pp. 136-7.

are communities in which specific and essential aspects of spirituality can be realized. But they may also be viewed from the comprehensive standpoint of social life as a whole. In this perspective they become „partial-totalities“ (Teilganzen) and stand in relationship to one another according to the degree and dignity of the spirituality which can be realized in each of them. For example the institution comprising the totality of economic relations stands lower on the scale of spiritual being than that comprising religious relations. The highest community is found in humankind's relationship to God:

„Just as a member of a totality points to the totality of which it is a part, so that totality points in its turn to a higher one...The center of the highest totality points to God“.¹⁰

Voegelin's concern with these issues in the work of Spann engaged him further in the study of Scheler. Scheler's criticism of Kant's ethics in *Der Formalismus* carries forward the earlier critiques of Fichte and Spann, and thus develops an analysis of the human person as „microcosmos“ and „microtheos“.¹¹ In Voegelin's only published work devoted entirely to Kant, „Das Sollen im System Kants“ (1930), he explicitly acknowledges his debt to Scheler: „The informed reader will easily note the close connection of my analysis with that of others, especially with that of Scheler“.¹²

¹⁰ Othmar Spann, *Gesellschaftslehre* (1923) p. 179; *Gesellschaftslehre*, vol. 4, *Gesamtausgabe*, p.221.

¹¹ Max Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, vol. 2, *Gesammelte Werke*, pp. 406 ff.

¹² Eric Voegelin, „Das Sollen im System Kants“, in: *Gesellschaft, Staat und Recht*, edited by Alfred Verdross, (Vienna: Verlag Julius Springer, 1931), pp. 136-173. Here p. 137, footnote.

b) Phenomenological influences

In post World War I German philosophy, the investigation of man's relationship to God received strong impulses from the development of phenomenology. As early as 1922, Voegelin's unpublished dissertation revealed that as a twenty-one-year-old sociologist, he had a mature understanding of the achievements of Edmund Husserl. In *Wechselwirkung und Gezweiung* (Reciprocity and Community), Voegelin criticized Georg Simmel's sociology for its reduction of social phenomena to psychological relations between individuals, and presented Othmar Spann's theory of the primacy of the spiritual community as the only solid basis upon which to build sociological theory. The epistemological starting point taken by Voegelin for the thesis is the Critical Idealism of Edmund Husserl.¹³

Despite the central importance of Husserl's work, the philosopher most intimately associated with the phenomenological movement and religious philosophy in this period is Max Scheler. August Brunner, in his „Foreword“ to the English translation of *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, states the case succinctly:

„Scheler was not really a pupil of Husserl. He started out from Eucken and his doctrine of the spiritual life as a final reality. But his intuitive inclinations were very soon bound to feel attracted by the new method and to recognize in it a tool suitable to his own interests. The thing that was new in his philosophy was in fact that he used phenomenology for the

¹³ Eric Voegelin, *Wechselwirkung und Gezweiung*; Doctoral dissertation; Wien, Universität zu Wien. Manuscript and typescript, (Eric-Voegelin-Archiv, Geschwister-Scholl-Institut für Politische Wissenschaft der Universität München; Voegelin Archive, Hoover Institution, Stanford: Box 51 File 5), p. II.

investigation of spiritual realities...Scheler shows the characteristic quality of that which is religious. It is a particular essence, which cannot be reduced to anything else. It is a sphere that belongs essentially to man; without it he would not be man... This religious sphere is the most essential, the decisive one. It determines man's basic attitude towards reality and thus in a sense the colour, extent and position of all the other human domains in life" (E., 7-8).

The direction which Voegelin's own interests took, towards the meditative study of the relationship of human personhood to the divine, and towards a recovery and renewal for the modern world of Augustine's path of meditation, would have found encouragement in Scheler's application of the phenomenological approach to religion in *The Eternal in Man*. That Scheler himself was convinced that these issues must be pursued, is evident from his introduction to this work, which we must cite *in extenso*. He declared there that he

„...offers to the public for the first time a few fruits of the work on the philosophy of religion which has occupied the author for many years- the underlying bases for the systematic construction of a 'natural theology'. The author believes these fundamentals, despite all foreseen objections, to be more assured than traditional bases and also of a nature to encounter a deeper understanding and sounder appreciation from the man of today than the traditional systems of religious theory which lean either to Aquinas or to Kant and Schleiermacher. In the same way as what Kant called the 'scandal of philosophy,' it is a scandal of theology and philosophy alike that the questions of natural theology, i.e. the very thing designed to unite minds irrespective of sectarian differences, should divide minds even more deeply than points of confessional dogma. It is a further scandal that whatever knowledge of God men owe solely to the spontaneous reason in every man, that which should therefore enable us to see the true bounds of tradition and revelation, is for the most part cultivated in purely traditional systems of doctrine.

The author is profoundly convinced... that natural theology is unable to perform its task of unification either on a basis of Thomism or on a basis derived from the philosophical era ushered in by Kant.

This task it can only perform once it has delivered the kernel of Augustinism from the husklike accretions of history, and employed phenomenological philosophy to provide it with a fresh and more deeply rooted foundation. (Phenomenological philosophy is one which undertakes to look on the essential fundamentals of all existence with rinsed eyes, and redeems the bills of exchange which an over-complex civilization has drawn on them in terms of symbol upon symbol.) When this has been done, natural theology will more and more clearly reveal and demonstrate that immediate contact of the soul with God which Augustine, from the experience of his great heart, was striving with the apparatus of neo-Platonism to capture and fix in words. Only a theology of the essential experience of divinity can open our eyes to the lost truths of Augustine“ (E., 12-13)¹⁴.

¹⁴ „Sie übergibt der Öffentlichkeit zum ersten Male einige Früchte der religionsphilosophischen Gedankenarbeit, die den Verfasser seit vielen Jahren beschäftigte – die ersten Fundamente des systematischen Baus einer ‘natürlichen Theologie’. Der Verfasser hält diese Fundamente bei allem erwarteten Widerspruch für gesicherter als die überlieferten und auch für geeignet, vom heutigen Menschen tiefer verstanden und besser gewürdigt zu werden als die traditionellen Systeme der Religionsbegründung, die entweder mehr auf Thomas Aquinas oder auf Kant und Schleiermacher beruhen. Es ist – analog dem, was Kant den ‘Skandal der Philosophie’ genannt hat – ein ‘Skandal der Theologie und Philosophie’ zugleich, daß die Fragen der natürlichen Theologie, d. h. daß eben das, was über die positiven Glaubensgegensätze hinweg die Geister zu einen bestimmt ist, sie eher noch tiefer scheidet als die konfessionellen Gegensätze selbst; daß ferner, was an Gotteserkenntnis der spontanen Vernunft in jedem Menschen allein soll verdankt werden und bloße Tradition und Offenbarung eben damit begrenzen soll, am meisten in nur traditionellen Lehrsystemen gepflegt wird. Der Verfasser ist der tiefen ... Überzeugung, daß weder auf dem Boden der Philosophie des Thomas Aquinas noch auf dem Boden der durch Kant eingeleiteten philosophischen Periode die natürliche Gotteserkenntnis je wieder diese einende Aufgabe zu erfüllen vermag. Sie wird sie nur erfüllen, wenn sie den Kern des Augustinismus von seinen zeitgeschichtlichen Hüllen befreit und mit den Gedankenmitteln der

That Voegelin himself, after Scheler's death in 1928, was to continue the pursuit of these „lost truths of divinity,“ we shall see as we turn now to a crucial incomplete manuscript of 1931.

II.

Voegelin's 'Herrschaftslehre': overview

The unpublished text *Herrschaftslehre* is divided into three chapters.¹⁵ In the second and third chapters, Voegelin discusses theories of domination as presented by Othmar Spann, Max Weber, Max Scheler, Carl Schmitt, Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche, Friedrich Wolters (historian and author of the

phänomenologischen Philosophie neu und tiefer begründet; d.h. der Philosophie, die die Wesensgrundlagen alles Daseins mit gereinigten Augen zu schauen unternimmt und die Wechsel einlöst, die eine allzu verwickelte Kultur auf sie in immer neuen Symbolen gezogen hat. Dann wird sie jenen unmittelbaren Kontakt der Seele mit Gott immer klarer aufweisen, den Augustin mit den Mitteln des neuplatonischen Denkens an der Erfahrung seines großen Herzens immer neu aufzuspüren und in Worte zu fassen bemüht war. Nur eine Theologie der Wesenserfahrung des Göttlichen vermag für die verlorenen Wahrheiten Augustins die Augen wieder zu öffnen.“ Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, S. 8-9.

¹⁵ Eric Voegelin, *Herrschaftslehre*, circa 1930-1932. 146 typed pages; small number of manuscript pages. Eric-Voegelin-Archiv, Geschwister-Scholl-Institut der Universität München; Voegelin Archive, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Box 53 File 5.

The first two chapters are incomplete. Chapter One has 22 pages; Chapter Two has 11 pages (numbered 1 to 10a); Chapter Three has 113 pages.

Citations of the *Herrschaftslehre* are given in the text in parentheses as *H.*, followed by the chapter number in roman and the page number in arabic numerals: thus (*H.*, I. 6). References by Voegelin to Augustine's *Confessions* are taken over in the form in which Voegelin cited them; the Latin is replaced with the English translation of William Watts (1631): *St. Augustine's Confessions*, 2 vols., Loeb Classics, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1912).

authorized biography of Stefan George), Helmut Plessner and others. Following an analysis of Max Weber's views on domination Voegelin concludes that, the elements of „inner domination“, as opposed to legal notions of „legitimate rule“ have been neglected.

Finding that the theme of „spiritual power“ is not adequately dealt with (*H.*, III. 1, 7-8), Voegelin turns to Othmar Spann as „the social scientist who has most rigorously examined the nature of man (Daseinsverfassung des Menschen)“. For Spann, he continues,

„[t]he human is principally not a closed being for whom the world is outside, so that, in the last instance, all spiritual phenomena would have to be led back to the constitution of objects by a consciousness, led back to the modes of appearance of an object for a subject; even if, to a transcendental purified consciousness ... Rather the human is a spiritual being (Geistwesen) who is open to a super-personal spiritual reality (überpersönliches geistig Reales), which we must more closely define“.

Voegelin then adds a direct citation from Spann:

„The basic ontological fact is that the ‘spirit is contained in a higher totality ... All the contents of our spirit, and the spirit itself, are linked to and held in a higher (sc. spiritual reality - WP).’“ (*H.*, III. 11).¹⁶

¹⁶ „Auf deutlichste und unerbittlichste wurde innerhalb der Gesellschaftslehre die Frage nach der Daseinsverfassung des Menschen von Spann gestellt. Der Mensch ist grundsätzlich nicht ein in sich geschlossenes Wesen, dem gegenüber die Welt liegt, so das alle Geisteserscheinungen zuletzt zurückzuführen wären auf die Konstitution von Gegenständen durch ein Bewußtsein, auf die Erscheinungsweise eines Gegenständlichen für ein Subjekt, und sei es auch ein transzendental gereinigtes.... Er ist vielmehr als Geistwesen offen gegen ein noch näher zu bestimmendes überpersonales geistig Reales. Der ontologische Grundsachverhalt ist ‘das Enthaltensein des Geistes in einem höheren Ganzen auf Grund der Rückverbundenheit’. ‘Aller

Voegelin's own intention, to „more closely define“ the nature of the spiritual reality of man as it had been outlined by Othmar Spann, was carried forward in the first chapter of the *Herrschaftslehre* (H., I. 1). There Voegelin argued that St Augustine has laid the basis for an understanding of the person in the exercise (Vollzug) of a meditation in which the human discovers himself as a person. To explicate the stages of St Augustine's meditation Voegelin also discusses Descartes, Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler.

Our examination of this chapter is hampered by the fact that the surviving text is incomplete, and lacks the pages devoted to Scheler. Nevertheless, through the references to Scheler in extant parts of the text, we can point to the passages in his writings which were relevant to Voegelin's discussion. The references given are both to the general theme of phenomenology – the correlation between intentional act and object – and to the specific religious act and its fulfilment (Erfüllung) in a godly being. We now turn to these themes.

a) Meditation in the 'Herrschaftslehre': Antecedents in Scheler

Voegelin's study of human existence in the *Herrschaftslehre* begins with the sentence:

„The determination (Bestimmung) of that which a person essentially is (in ihrem Kerne sei) takes place, when the attempt is made with adequate means, in a basic form of philosophical thinking (Grundform philosophischen Denkens)

Inhalt unseres Geistes, unser Geist als Ganzes, ist rückverbunden, ist enthalten in einem Höheren“.

which we will characterize by the name which Descartes gave it, meditation.“ (H.,I.1).¹⁷

Voegelin indicates that his understanding of meditation takes as its starting point Augustine's meditations on memory and thought as recorded in Books X and XI of the Confessions. He acknowledges that

„... the forms, in which his Christian thought moves, and the formulae which it finds, have remained to the present day the classic examples for investigations into the essence (Wesen)of the person and of time.“ (H., I. 1.)¹⁸

Voegelin then points out that there are two principal ways of exploring the essence of the person; one oriented to being, the other to becoming (H., I.1).

„Both ways, that of being and that of becoming, lead to the same goal, the meditating person to God and therewith the knowing person (Erkennenden) to insight into the essence of the human person, who can be characterized by his openness to a transcendent being, by his being a frontier between the world, with its being and becoming, and a super-world (Über-Welt).“ (H., I. 7)¹⁹

¹⁷ „Die Bestimmung dessen, was Person in ihrem Kerne sei vollzieht sich, wo immer der Versuch mit zureichenden Mitteln unternommen wird, in einer Grundform philosophischen Denkens, die wir mit dem Namen bezeichnen wollen, den Descartes ihr gegeben hat, als Meditation.“

¹⁸ „Die Formen, in denen sich sein christliches Denken bewegt, und die Formeln die es findet ... sind, die (die) bis in die Gegenwart für die Untersuchungen über das Wesen von Person und Zeit als das klassische Vorbild gerühmt und befolgt wurden.“

¹⁹ „Beide meditativen Schemata ,das des Seins und das des Werdens, führen zum gleichen Ziel, den Meditierenden zu Gott und zugleich damit den Erkennenden zur Einsicht in das Wesen der menschlichen Person, das bezeichnet werden kann durch ihre Offenheit gegen ein transzendentes Sein, durch seinen Grenzcharakter zwischen der Welt, mit ihrem Sein und Werden, und einer Über-Welt.“

In what follows I will review Voegelin's own discussion of the meditation on being, including some references to the meditation on becoming, and I will indicate the parallels between this discussion and that undertaken in the writings of Max Scheler.

Immediately we may note that Voegelin's characterization of the human being as a „border“ between the world and God, is also the view held by Scheler:

„The human being is a between (Zwischen), a border (Grenze) and a passage, an appearance of God in the current of life and an eternal overcoming of life over itself.“

Scheler writes:

„[The „human“ is] the intention and gesture (Geste) of Transcendence itself, the human is the being (Wesen) which prays and seeks God...It is not that 'the human prays', but rather that the human being is the prayer of life overcoming itself; he does not seek God – he is the living X which seeks God!“²⁰

For this reason Scheler rejects theories which try to explain man's spiritual being in terms of a so-called natural being.²¹ Rather, he declares, there is a division through the unity of the „human“, understood as a natural creature, which is „infinitely greater than that between humans and animals in the naturalistic sense“.

„Between those who are 'born again' and the 'old Adam', between the 'child of God' and the maker of tools and

²⁰ „Er ist ein 'Zwischen', eine 'Grenze', ein 'Übergang', ein 'Gotterscheinen' im Strome des Lebens und ein ewiges 'Hinaus' des Lebens über sich selbst ...“ / „'Mensch' in diesem ganz neuen Sinne ist die Intention und Geste der 'Transzendenz' selbst, ist das Wesen, das betet und Gott sucht. Nicht 'der Mensch betet' – er ist das Gebet des Lebens über sich hinaus; 'er sucht nicht Gott' – er ist das lebendige X, das Gott sucht!“

²¹ Max Scheler, *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, vol. 3, *Gesammelte Werke*, p. 186

machines ('homo faber') there exists an essential difference that cannot be bridged. On the other hand, between animal and homo faber there is only a difference of degree".²²

The principal presentation of Scheler's philosophy of the person encompasses more than two hundred pages and cannot be summed up here.²³ However, the following points may be emphasized, in order to indicate the parallels between his argument, and Voegelin's characterization of the human being as a „frontier“ between the world and the super-world. (*H.*, I.7)

Noetic acts, Scheler holds, are demarcated from psychic functions. Functions take place, acts must be committed. The level of noetic acts (Geist) is that of the meaning of experiences, and not of the experiences themselves. Since the person is only found in the meaning of experiences, he necessarily transcends all experiences as experiences.

Therefore, although spiritual meanings can be indexed „in time“ – for they are accompanied by the modes of experience of the human whose body and soul are subject to the laws of the space-time continuum – the noetic life itself transcends the physical and psychic realms. Noetic acts are „essentially psycho-physically indifferent“.²⁴

²² Zwischen dem 'Wiedergeborenen' und dem 'alten Adam', zwischen dem 'Kind Gottes' und dem Verfertiger von Werkzeugen und Maschinen ('homo faber') besteht ein unüberbrückbarer Wesensunterschied; zwischen Tier und homo faber hingegen besteht ein Gradunterschied.“ Max Scheler, *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, vol. 3, *Gesammelte Werke*, p. 190

²³ Max Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, vol. 2, *Gesammelte Werke*, pp. 381-599

²⁴ Max Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, vol. 2, *Gesammelte Werke*, p. 382

Scheler points out that since noetic acts cannot be found in time and space, they resist „objectification“. The noetic acts of the person can only be understood by other persons re-enacting them. The person is not absorbed in his acts, but remains the quality-giving-direction in each act. The center of the person is love, understood as a quality which leads to deeper and deeper knowledge of value and therefore of being. There is a hierarchy of loveable qualities and of types of persons and acts corresponding to these qualities. At the height of this hierarchy stand the human beings who have learned to see themselves, their fellow humans, and the world in the light of the person of persons, God. The experience of the spiritual community with God is the model of all community:

„all loving, contemplating, thinking and willing is intentionally united *in deo*“.²⁵

Having determined the reality of the human person as the In-between (Zwischen) between „world“ and God, Scheler then attempts to rescue the insights of Augustine through an analysis of the „religious act“ as the personal act *sui generis*. In this connection, Scheler emphasizes the importance of meditation. There is a „prejudice“, he writes, to the effect that „no mystical ‘experimental theology’ could ever acquire any kind of consistent universal validity in the sphere of religious experience or for the theory of such experience“. The reason for this view lies „in the lack of knowledge and appreciation of psychic techniques as a means not to ethical, practical ends but to an increase in religious knowledge“. Scheler adds that his own philosophy of religion will only find its „full elaboration and verification“ in „a fundamental treatment ... of the technique appertaining to the mystical experience of divinity

²⁵ Max Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, vol. 2, *Gesammelte Werke*, p. 395

and the corresponding living network of procedures and states of mind“ (E., 30).

b) The direction of meditation: Voegelin and Scheler

Voegelin begins his own discussion of Augustine's meditation with the observation that

„every meditation requires a direction determining beginning. For Augustine (*Conf.*, lib. x) the question is: Where does the soul find God, when it seeks Him in order to rest in Him? After much unsuccessful seeking, he must say: 'Nor in all these which I thus run over consulting thee, can I find any one safe place to settle my soul in, but in thyself only; into whom let all my scattered pieces be gathered together, nor let anything of mine be turned back from thee' (x. 60).

This turn (Wendung) is characteristic for the course of this and every genuine meditation, because it clearly expresses the fact that the seeking (Suchen) has a direction, but no rational notations (Merkmale) which can describe its goal. Augustine does not seek God of whom he has a specific concept (Begriff), but that point in the movement of his soul at which his soul finds peace. This point is found when no driving moment (treibendes Moment) remains. The meditative course must therefore be understood as the step by step separating out (allmähliches Ausscheiden) of all that which is unsettling (Beunruhigendes), all that which is merely world immanent (irdisch), until the soul stands naked before God (nackt vor Gott). This place (Ort) can only be negatively determined as that which is none of those which the meditative course has passed through in the soul's state of unease. It is radically the other place. What it positively is can only be seen by the one who follows the whole movement of the confessio, who has

himself enacted the confession (Bekenntnis) to God“ (H., I.1).²⁶

In making these points, Voegelin's study has many points of contact with Scheler's enquiries:

First, we find that what Voegelin refers to as the „direction determining beginning“ – the intention of the heart to reach the world transcending God – corresponds in Scheler to the religious act being „an essential endowment of the human mind and soul“ (E., 267). The religious act must leave all the mere „worldly“ behind. Therefore, he writes,

„[t]he most conclusive, though merely negative, sign of a religious act, as distinct from all other acts of mind or spirit, is an attendant insight into the fact that of its essence it cannot be fulfilled by any finite object belonging to, or itself forming, the 'world'. In this sense Augustine's dictum, *Inquietum cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te*, is a basic formula for all religious acts“ (E., 251).²⁷

²⁶ „Jede Meditation bedarf eines richtungsbestimmenden Anfanges, der für Augustin (conf. lib.X.) die Frage ist: wo findet die Seele Gott wenn sie Ihn sucht, um in ihnen auszuruhen; nach vielem vergeblichem Suchen, muß er sagen: *neque in his omnibus, quae percurro consulens te, invenio tutum locum animae meae nisi in te, quo colligantur sparsa mea nec a te quicquam recedat ex me* (x.10). Die Wendung ist charakteristisch für den Gang dieser wie jeder echten Meditation, weil sich in ihr deutlich ausdrückt, daß das Suchen eine Richtung hat, aber kein rationalen Merkmalen zu beschreibendes Ziel. Augustin sucht nicht Gott, von dem er einen bestimmten Begriff hätte, sondern einen Punkt in der Bewegung seiner Seele, an dem sie zur Ruhe kommt, und dieser Punkt ist gefunden, wenn keine treibenden Momente im meditierenden Gang mehr zurückbleiben, so daß dieser Gang selbst zu verstehen ist als ein allmähliches Ausscheiden alles Beunruhigenden, alles Irdischen, bis die Seele nackt vor Gott steht. Der Ort der endlichen Ruhe kann nur dadurch bestimmt werden, das er keiner der durchlaufenen beunruhigenden ist; er ist der 'andere Ort' schlechthin. Was er aber nun positiv sei, kann nur der sehen, der die ganze Bewegung der confessio, des Bekenntnisses zu Gott, mitgemacht hat.“

²⁷ „Das schärfste, obzwar nur negative diagnostische Kennzeichen eines religiösen Aktes im Unterschiede zu allen anderen geistigen Akten ist daher

Scheler then elaborates this insight in the following terms:

„The first thing peculiar to any religious act is that not only the things and facts experienced by the person, but also all things of a finite and contingent kind, are gathered together in a single whole, which includes the subject's own person, and are joined in the idea of 'the world'. Without this preparatory operation a religious act cannot take place.

The second thing proper to the religious act is that in its intention this 'world' is overlapped or transcended. It is not a question of this particular transitory world that 'happens' to exist, but a question of everything partaking of the nature of 'world' in general- that is, a world in which there is somehow or other realized an embodiment of the essences realized in the world which I know.

Transcendence in general is a peculiarity of every conscious intention, for in every one there is present an intending-above-and-beyond its own empirical standpoint, together with the simultaneous awareness that the being of the object reaches out beyond the empirical content of the intention. But only where the thing thus transcended is the world as a whole (including the subject's own person) are we entitled to speak of a religious act...“ (E., 250-251).²⁸

die in ihm mitgegebene unmittelbare Einsicht in seine wesensmäßige Unerfüllbarkeit durch irgend einen der 'Welt' angehörigen oder die Welt selbst ausmachenden endlichen Gegenstand. In diesem Sinne ist das Augustinische : *inquietum cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te* eine Grundformel für alle religiösen Akte.“ Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, S. 245

²⁸ „Das erste, was jedem religiösen Akt eigentümlich ist, ist, daß in ihm nicht nur die von der Person erfahrenen Dinge und Tatsachen, sondern alle Dinge endlicher und kontingenter Art in ein Ganzes zusammengefaßt werden mit Einschluß der eigenen Person und zur Idee der 'Welt' vereinigt werden. Ohne diesen vorbereitenden Akt kann ein religiöser Akt nicht stattfinden. Das zweite, was zum religiösen Akt selbst gehört, ist, daß in seiner Intention diese 'Welt' übergriffen oder transzendiert wird. Es handelt sich dabei gar nicht nur um diese einmalige zufällig daseiende Welt, sondern um alles von der Art einer 'Welt' überhaupt, d.h. einer Welt, in der sich ein Inbegriff derselben Wesenheiten so oder anders realisiert wie in dieser, die mir bekannt ist. Transzendenz im allgemeinen ist eine Eigentümlichkeit, die jeder Bewußtseinsintention zukommt, denn in jeder ist das Hinaus- und

Secondly, we find parallels in the treatment by Scheler and Voegelin of the act in which meditation finds its completion. For Voegelin, as we have seen, the „other place,“ where the soul stands „naked before God,“ can only be seen by one who has himself followed the whole movement of the confession and has enacted the confession to God (*H. I, 1*). Scheler treats this same issue in terms of the difference between metaphysical and religious acts:

„The religious act ... demands an answer, an act of reciprocity on the part of that very object to which its intention is directed. And this implies that one may only speak of 'religion' where the object bears a divine personal form and where revelation (in the widest sense) on the part of this personal object is what fulfils the religious act and its intention. While for metaphysics the personality of the divine forms a never-attainable boundary of cognition, for religion this personality is the alpha and omega... The religious act is unable from its own resources, or with the help of thought, to construct what hovers as an objective idea, notion or intuition before the human performer of the act. He must somehow receive the truth he 'intends', the salvation and felicity he 'seeks' – and receive it via the very being he seeks. To that extent he is in his primary intention already disposed for and concerned with possible reception, however much a multifarious internal and external spontaneous activity may be a prerequisite of his reaching the threshold where the reception begins. Where the soul does not – however indirectly – touch God, and touch him in knowing and feeling itself touched by God, no religious relationship can subsist-

Hinübermeinen über ihren eigenen Erlebnisbestand gegeben, und das gleichzeitige Bewußtsein, daß das Sein des Gegenstandes über den erlebten Intensionsgehalt hinausreicht. Aber erst wo das also Transzendierte die Welt als Ganzes ist (mit Einschluß der eigenen Person), haben wir das Recht, von einem religiösen Akt zu reden.“ Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, S. 245

not even a relation of 'natural' religion." (*E.*, 253-254;²⁹; compare *E.*, 168f)

c) Via negationis in Voegelin and Scheler

In the Herrschaftslehre, Voegelin points out that in Augustine's meditation,

„the via negationis..., the rejection of all empirical levels of being, leads at last to the highest level of being, that which all world immanent things are not. The question of Cap. 6 expresses the pure form of this elevation:

‘What now do I love, whenas I love thee? Not the beauty of any corporal thing; not the order of times, not the brightness of the light which we do behold, so gladsome to our eyes: not the pleasant melodies of songs of all kinds; nor the fragrant smell of flowers, and ointment, and spices: not manna and honey; nor any

²⁹ „Der religiöse Akt fordert ... eine Antwort, einen Wider- und Gegenakt seitens eben des Gegenstandes, auf den er seinem intentionalen Wesen nach abzielt. Und damit ist schon gesagt, daß von 'Religion' nur die Rede sein kann, wo ihr Gegenstand göttliche personale Gestalt trägt und wo Offenbarung (im weitesten Sinne) dieses Persönlichen dem religiösen Akt und seiner Intention die Erfüllung gibt. Während für die Metaphysik die Persönlichkeit des Göttlichen eine nie erreichbare Grenze des Erkennens bildet, ist für die Religion diese Persönlichkeit das A und O. Wo sie nicht vor Augen steht, gedacht, geglaubt, inwendig vernommen wird – da ist von Religion im strengen Sinne keine Rede. Denn alle diese Momente sind ja wesensuntrennbar voneinander. Der religiöse Akt vermag nicht von sich aus oder mit Hilfe des Denkens dasjenige zu konstruieren, was als Gegenstands-idee, -anschauung, -gedanke dem Menschen vorschwebt, der ihn vollzieht. Er muß die Wahrheit, die er intendiert, das Heil und Glück, das er 'sucht', irgendwie empfangen -und er muß es empfangen durch eben das Wesen, das er sucht. Er ist insofern schon in seiner ersten Intention auf ein mögliches Empfangen hingerichtet und angelegt – wie vielseitige innere und äußere spontane Tätigkeit auch die Erreichung der Schwelle voraussetze, auf der das Empfangen einsetzt. Wo die Seele nicht – wie vermittelt immer – Gott berührt und ihn dadurch berührt, daß sie sich durch Gott berührt weiß und fühlt, da besteht kein religiöses Verhalten – auch keine 'natürliche' Religion.“ Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, S. 248

fair limbs that are so acceptable to fleshly embracements. I love none of these things whenas I love my God.’

At the highpoint of the negation he [Augustine] follows then with *et tamen ...* the turn back, that indeed God is none of this, but for the soul it is nevertheless somehow God... All statements are, at the same time, both made and negated (*gleich gesetzt und wieder aufgehoben*), in order to determine that place at which the fullness of being (*Fülle des Seins*) is to be found and peace attained by overcoming all which is earthly and impure in being (*Ruhe von allem Irdisch-Unreinen des Seins*).

‘And yet (*et tamen*) I love a certain kind of light, and a kind of voice, and...a kind of embracement, whenas I love my God; who is both the light and the voice, and the sweet smell, and the meat, and the embracement of my inner man: where the light shineth into my soul, which no place can receive; that voice soundeth, which time deprives me not of; and that fragrancy smelleth which no wind scatters; and that meat tasteth, which eating devours not; and that embracement clingeth to me, which satiety divorceth not. This it is which I love, whenas I love my God.’
(*H., I.1-2*).³⁰

³⁰ „Die *via negationis*..., die Ablehnung aller empirischen Ränge des Seins, führt endlich zum höchsten Rang, der alles Irdische nicht ist. Die Frage des cap. 6 (I.x) ist die reine Form dieser Erhebung: *quid autem amo, cum te amo? non speciem corporis nec decus temporis, non candorem lucis ecce istum amicum oculis, non dulces melodias cantilenarum omnimodarum, non florum et ungentorum et aromatum suaveolentiam, non manna et mella, non membra acceptabilis carnis amplexibus: non haec amo cum amo deum meum*. Auf dem Höhepunkt der Negation erfolgt dann mit einem *et tamen ...* die Wendung zurück, daß Gott alles dies zwar nicht, es aber auf eine Weise ‘dennoch’ für die Seele sei; Gott ist alles das, was negiert wurde, und er ist es doch zugleich auch wieder nicht; alle Aussagen werden zugleich gesetzt und wieder aufgehoben, um jenen Ort zu bestimmen, an dem die Fülle des Seins zu finden ist zugleich mit der Ruhe von allem Irdisch-Unreinen des Seins: *et tamen amo quandam lucem et quandam vocem et quandam odorem et quandam cibum et quendam amplexum, cum amo deum meum, lucem, vocem, odorem, cibum, amplexum interioris hominis mei, et ubi sonat, quod non rapit tempus, et ubi olet, quod non spargit flatus, et ubi sapit, quod non minuit edacitas, et ubi haeret, quod non divellit satietas. hoc est quod amo, cum deum meum amo.*“

This *via negationis* is to be found also at the root of Scheler's „phenomenological method.“ He himself indicated that his method, independently of the field of its application, owes its origin to the ‘negative theology’ of Plotinus:

„The...method of successively peeling away the correlates and contraries that are felt to offer progressive indications to the ‘*phenomenon demonstrandum*,’ with the consequent laying bare of the phenomenon and its presence to the inspecting mind, is the way which leads to the phenomenological scrutiny of the essence. The indefinability of the X under investigation (per genus et differentia specifica) is a sure sign that in this X we have a genuine elementary essence which underlies ultimate concepts but is itself ‘inconceivable’. For ‘to conceive’ means to reduce the object of a concept in terms of other concepts.“ (E., 170)³¹

Scheler acknowledges that the deepest intentions of his method are not generally understood:

„Many who make use of this method... are surprisingly unaware that as a method it is basically none other than that of ‘negative theology’. For the method of ‘negative theology’ itself arose purely from the deep conviction that the divine and holy form as such a prime elementary quality which can only be demonstrated by a slow process of elimination and analogy, a quality which must satisfy all concepts of the divine- positive and negative- but itself remains

³¹ „Diese ... Methode des sukzessiven Abschälens des einem aufzuweisenden (zu ‘demonstrierenden’) Phänomen in fühlbar abgestufter Weise Verwandten, Entgegengesetzten und die so erfolgende Herausschälung des Phänomens, endlich das vor den geistigen Blick Hinsetzen des herausgeschälten Phänomens, ist der Weg, der zur phänomenologischen Wesenschau führt. Die undefinierbarkeit des gesuchten X (per genus und differentia specifica) ist geradezu ein sicheres Kennzeichen dafür, daß es sich bei dem X um eine echte, elementare Washeit handelt, die letzte Begriffe fundiert, aber darum selbst nicht ‘begriffen’ werden kann. Denn ‘Begriffen’ heißt eben ein durch einen Begriff Gemeintes auf andere Begriffe zurückführen.“ Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, S. 167

inconceivable. There is no doubt that as an approach and method phenomenology was first employed, in the time of Plotinus, in exactly this theological context.“ (E., 171)³²

Scheler's study also touched on the point developed by Voegelin – that the experience of the „fullness of being“ is followed by „*et tamen*“ (Augustine) in order to see the levels of being (which have been overcome in the meditative ascent) for the first time in their relationship to absolute being. Firstly, Scheler acknowledges the absolute distinction between God and the world:

„The *immanentia Dei in mundo* belongs to the essence of God. God is in every existent, so far as it is... But it is not correct to say also that everything is in him, as is said in pantheism and acosmic pantheism; there is no *immanentia mundi in Deo*. For the world is according to reality distinct from God, and only because God is infinite mind can God notwithstanding be in everything.“ (E., 193)³³

³² „Vielen, die diese Methoden anwenden ... ist es viel zu wenig bewußt, daß sie (als pure Methode) im Grunde keine andere ist als diejenige der sog. 'negativen Theologie'. Denn die 'negative Theologie'-Methode ist selbst nur der tiefen Erkenntnis entsprungen, daß das Göttliche und Heilige als solches eine urgegebene Qualität ist, die nur durch Abschälung von anderem und durch Analogie langsam aufgewiesen werden kann; die alle Begriffe vom Göttlichen – positive wie negative – zu erfüllen berufen ist, selbst aber unbegreiflich ist. Ja die Phänomenologie überhaupt ist – im Laufe der Geschichte des Plotinismus – als Einstellung und Methode gerade auf theologischem Boden zuerst angewandt worden.“ Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, S. 167 f.

³³ „Die 'Immanentia Dei in Mundo' gehört zum Wesen Gottes. Gott ist in allem Daseienden, soweit es ist. ... Nicht aber gilt, daß auch alles in ihm sei (Pantheismus und akosmischer Pantheismus), nicht gilt eine Immanentia Mundi in Deo. Denn die Welt ist der Realität nach von Gott verschieden, und nur weil Gott unendlicher Geist ist, vermag Gott gleichwohl in allem zu sein.“ Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, S. 189

Later, however, Scheler points also to the new knowledge of the realm of being which is reached, when the meditative ascent has been concluded:

„Knowledge of all possible truth, which in itself is an absolute value for philosophy and science (in the latter case, within the limitations imposed by technical aims), takes on a new axiological meaning. It is now subordinated to the values and final purpose of an ontic process, a becoming, which far transcends all knowledge, namely to the value and end of the projection of human personality into God's personality. At the same time it is subsidiary in the cognition of objects to an extension which is to be coeffectuated in the cognitive act: here I refer to the extrapolation from known things of their ultimate determination or destiny, which is an ontic participation in God and can be apprehended when we share some part of the idea which God has of them. Indeed, at this stage knowledge is no longer immaterial for things. We may now say that things are in some way affected by the knowledge man acquires of them. Without undergoing a strictly real alteration (such as is possible through volition, re-conception and action) or being in whole or part constructed (Kantian fashion) by the human mind- without deriving their nature and substance via the cognitive act, since these they possess independently of man through God's idea of them- the 'determination' and 'meaning' of things are here realized by man for the very first time in the cognitive act. Things acquire ontically the part of their determination and meaning which ideally they already possess: they are led, raised, restored to God as the root of all things, the underlying concept and consummation of all essences“ (E., 303).³⁴

³⁴ „Und endlich nimmt nun erst auch die Erkenntnis aller möglichen Wahrheit selber, die für die philosophische und wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis (im letzteren Falle zwar unter der Schranke möglicher technischer Zielsetzung) ein absoluter Selbstwert ist, einen neuen axiologischen Sinn an. Sie ordnet sich nun unter dem Werte und dem Ziele eines ontischen Prozesses, eines Werdens, das selber über alle Erkenntnis hinausragt: dem Werte und dem Ziele der Wesenseinbildung der menschlichen Persönlichkeit in die göttliche Persönlichkeit; und gleichzeitig der durch den

d) *Meminisse me memini*

Voegelin's understanding of the goal of meditation, like that of Scheler, is firmly rooted in Augustine's presentation of the meditative ascent.

„After passing through the levels of being from corpus and sensus, to anima, the next step in Augustine's meditation is named, in a general fashion (ganz allgemein), 'memoria'.

'I will soar beyond that faculty of mine, by which I am united unto my body, and by which I fill the whole frame of it with life...Still rising by degrees unto him who hath made me and I come into these fields and spacious palaces of my memory.'³⁵

Within the faculty of memory (Gedächtnisvermögen) a series of degrees are distinguished. a) Memory of sensual

Erkenntnisakt (im Erkennen der Dinge) mitzuerwirkenden Hinführung – Hinaufführung der Dinge selbst zu ihrer Bestimmung: ihrer ontischen Teilnahme an Gott durch Teilgewinnung an der Idee, die Gott von ihnen hat. Erst damit ist die Erkenntnis nicht mehr gleichgültig für die Dinge. Vielmehr wird den Dingen auch etwas geleistet durch die Erkenntnis, die der Mensch von ihnen gewinnt. Ohne real verändert zu werden (wie solches nur durch Wollen, Bilden, Handeln möglich ist), ohne gar erst ganz oder zum Teile konstruiert zu werden durch den menschlichen Geist (Kant) – ohne erst ihre Bestimmungsart und ihren Bestimmungsinhalt, ihre Bedeutungsart und ihren Bedeutungsinhalt durch den menschlichen Erkenntnisakt zu gewinnen, die sie vielmehr ganz unabhängig vom Menschen schon besitzen durch die Ideen Gottes von ihnen –, wird doch diese 'Bestimmung' und 'Bedeutung' der Dinge durch den Erkenntnisakt seitens des Menschen allererst realisiert. Die Dinge gewinnen ontisch den Anteil an ihrer Bestimmung und Bedeutung, die sie idealiter schon besitzen: Sie werden Gott als der Wurzel aller Dinge, als den Wesensbegriff aller Wesen und damit auch des ihrigen 'zugeführt', zu ihm heraufgeführt, zu ihm zurückgeführt.“ Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, S. 298 f.

³⁵ Voegelin quotes the sentence: „transibo vim meam, qua haereo corpori – vitaliter compagem eius repleo“ from X. 7, and adds, after a comma: „gradibus ascendens ad eum, qui fecit me, et venio in campos et lata praetoria memoriae“ from X. 8, omitting the beginning of the latter sentence: „transibo ergo et istam naturae meae“. This was obviously done to avoid repetition. But, although it does not alter Augustine's meaning, it is not a sentence which Augustine wrote.

impressions, b) memory of objects of the nature of mathematical sentences (platonian anamnesis), c) memory of emotions (Affekte). And when all these levels have been mustered:

'I come to the memory of memory: and I remember myself to have remembered; like as if hereafter I shall call to remembrance that I have been able to remember these things now; it shall be by the force of my memory, that I shall be able to call it to remembrance' (cap. 13.).

The memory which remembers itself, the memory of memory, this iterative faculty (iterierbare Kraft) of the human is his inmost self, his *animus*. By means of this iterative capacity (Iterierbarkeit) the memory is 'quasi venter animi' (cap. 14).

'Great is the power of memory... and this thing is the mind, and this thing am I' (cap. 17).'

At this Voegelin stops to note the extent to which Augustine's meditation anticipates that of Descartes.

„In its most compact form,“ Voegelin continues, „this thought appears in a formulation which points to Descartes:

'It is I myself, that I remember, I the mind'; and in another place: 'I cannot so much as call myself without it (sc. memory) (cap. 16).'

The meditation finds its temporary (vorläufige) end in a definition of the center of the person (Personkern) as the iteration of memory: in the successive acts of memory which are directed in their turn to acts of memory, the ego ipse constitutes itself.“ (H., I. 2-3)³⁶

³⁶ „Die Erinnerung, die sich ihrer selbst erinnert, das Gedächtnis des Gedächtnisses, diese iterierbare Kraft des Menschen ist sein innerstes Selbst, sein animus; durch eben ihre Iterierbarkeit ist die memoria 'quasi venter animi' (c.14). 'magna vis est memoriae ... et hoc animus est, et hoc ego ipse sum' (c.17). Auf schärfste Zusammengedrängt wird der Gedanke in einer Formulierung, die auf Descartes vorweist, in c. 16: 'ego sum, qui memini, ego animus' ; und an einer andern Stelle: 'ipsum me non dico praeter illam (sc. memoriam)'. Die Meditation findet ihr vorläufiges Ende in einer Definition des Personkernes als der Iteration des Gedächtnisses; in den aufeinander bezogenen Akten der Erinnerung konstituiert sich das ego ipse.“

That the goal of the meditation, is the coming-to-rest of the soul in God, is beyond doubt central to Voegelin's understanding:

„However the center of the person is not the goal, which, from the beginning, was intended in the meditation; the ego is also world-immanent (diesseitig-irdisch); this level of the human spirit (Geist) must also be overcome in the transcendent (das Jenseits) of the human, in the super-ego (Über-Ich):

‘I will pass even beyond this faculty of mine...that I may approach thee, O sweet light’ (cap. 17).“

„The course of the meditation is prescribed by the structure of the world and culminates for the immanent world (das Diesseits) in a center, which is defined by means of the self-reflection of the spirit (Rückwendung des Geistes auf sich selbst) and ends by more precisely revealing being as that which, after overcoming the predicates and the structures of the immanent world, (is found) to border immediately on the immanent world. The course (of the meditation) leads from body to soul, from the soul to the ego ipse, and from the *ego ipse* to God... and finds its clear (eindeutig) end, when, after exhausting all of that which is predicable, reaches the place which is no longer a place in any palpable sense“ (H., I. 3).³⁷

³⁷ „Aber der Personskern ist nicht das Ziel, auf das hin die Meditation von Anfang her angelegt war; auch das Ego ist noch diesseitig-irdisch; auch diese Stufe des menschlichen Geistes muss noch überschritten werden in das Jenseits auch des Menschen, in das Über-Ich hinein: ‘transibo et hanc vim meam... ut pertendam ad te, dulce lumen’ (c.17) ...“ / „Der Gang der Meditation ist vorgeschrieben durch den Aufbau der Welt und gipfelt für das Diesseits in einem Kern, der durch die Rückwendung des Geistes auf sich selbst definiert wird, und endet mit der Verdeutlichung des Seins, in dem die Prädikate und Strukturen des diesseitigen aufgehoben sind, als jenem Sein, das an das diesseitige unmittelbar angrenzt. Vom Körper zur Seele, von der Seele, zum ego ipse, und vom ego ipse zu Gott ... führt der Weg, der eindeutig, sein Ende gefunden hat, wo nach Erschöpfung alles Aussagbaren der Ort erreicht ist, der kein Ort in irgend einem anschaulichen Sinn mehr ist.“

Up to this point, I have been following Voegelin's presentation of Augustine's meditation on being, and I have commented on some of its aspects with reference to Max Scheler's philosophy of religion. I turn now to Voegelin's summary of what both meditative ways, that of being and that of becoming, achieve in the *Confessions* of Augustine. Here Voegelin identifies the areas of the meditation which remain to be explored.

e) Meditation is the life of the Person

Voegelin indicates aims for his enquiry, which may be considered as carrying forward the intention declared by Scheler, of „delivering the kernel of Augustinianism from the husklike accretions of history“ (E., 13). The meditation of Augustine, he declares,

„is the basis for all more recent meditations. But it does not achieve everything which the new philosophy of the person (Personlehre) needs. For Augustine the problem of the person is not the focus, but is treated obliquely in the problematic of the dualism between creator and creatura. For the modern (neuzeitliche) philosophy of the person, the primary focus is that of the difference between person and world; for Augustine it was between God and the world. For him the entire creation is given objectively (gegenständlich gegeben) and within it the person. His vision of the world (Weltbild) is ordered in terms of space; from the bottom, from the corporeal, to the summit in the soul. The modern philosophy of the person proceeds from the outward, corporeal, as the outside (Aussen) of the person, to the most inward and intimate of the person. But for Augustine the self-possession (Selbsthabe) of the person, and therewith the process of iteration, is only a peripheral theme. The clearest symptom of this objective order (gegenständliche Ordnung) in which,

from the standpoint of an observer, even the person is an object among other objects, can be seen in Augustine's concept of time. It is not an internal consciousness of time (Zeitbewusstsein), not the constituent of the ego, but exactly the opposite, a dissolvent. The *tempora* and *secula* are identical with the *creatura* in the sense of a concrete realization (Erfülltheit) of the objective course of the world (Weltablauf), in which the person, to the extent that he does not hold himself in the *intentio* to God, is also consumed.“
(H., I. 8)³⁸

The modern meditations, to which Voegelin now turns, are characterized by having their center in the ego (Zentrum im Ich). In Descartes it becomes clear, he writes, that

„the meditation is the life of the person itself, in which the person attains certitude concerning his own essence (Eigenwesen). The person is both the subject and the object of the meditation. In the meditation as a series of acts the person experiences himself as a person (der Person wird die Person selbst gegeben) – not abstractly, not as the essence of the person qua person (an sich); but this essence experiences himself as a person in the concrete case of his own meditation

³⁸ „Die Meditation Augustins ist die Grundlage aller neueren Meditation, aber sie leistet noch nicht alles, was die neuere Personlehre braucht, weil das Problem der Person für Augustin nicht direkt in den Blick kommt, sondern oblique bei der Behandlung des Dualismus von creator und creatura. Für die neuzeitliche Personlehre ist der Gegensatz von Person und Welt primär, für Augustin der Gegensatz von Gott und Welt. Ihm ist die gesamte Schöpfung und in ihr die Person ein gegenständlich Gegebenes. Sein Weltbild ist räumlich geordnet von unten, dem Sinnlich-Körperlichen, nach oben, dem animus; das neuzeitliche ordnet sich vom Körperlichen als dem Außen zur Person als dem Innersten und Intimsten. Die Selbsthabe der Person und damit das Verfahren der Iteration tritt aus diesem Grunde bei Augustin nur nebenbei auf. Das deutlichste Symptom dieser gegenständlichen Ordnung, in der auch die Person für den Beschauer ein Objekt unter anderen ist, dürfte Augustins Begriff der Zeit sein – sie ist nicht ein inneres Zeitbewußtsein, nicht das Konstituens des Ich, sondern im Gegenteil sein Dissolvens; die *tempora* und *saecula* sind identisch mit der *creatura* im Sinne konkreter Erfülltheit des objektiven Weltablaufes, von dem auch die Person verzehrt wird, solange sie nicht die *intentio* auf Gott hat.“

(dieses Wesen am konkreten Fall der meditierenden und in ihrer Meditation sich selbst erfassenden Person).“ (H., I. 10)³⁹

Discussing Descartes' Third Meditation, Voegelin writes:

„In the meditation I experience myself only in the moment of the concrete *cogitare*. Beyond this moment and the next to the next and those which follow in time, I am only maintained by the power (trägt mich nur die Macht) which created me.... The act of creation fills not a moment of finite time, but is the continuously working force which conserves the person's life in time (das Leben der Person dauernd erhält).“ (H., I. 13-14)⁴⁰

Noetic being is not „in“ time. We have seen this point already in Scheler; the person is the prayer to God, the „movement“ toward God. The levels below the noetic realm of being, those of the psychic and somatic functions, are organized by the noetic. For this reason Scheler rejected all notions of proceeding from a falsely assumed „homo naturalis“ in order to „explain“ man and God. One must proceed from the noetic level of being which participates in the godly in the most intense form, and which is not of this world, but the

³⁹ „Die Meditation ist das Leben der Person selbst, in dem sie sich ihres Eigenwesens gewiß wird; die Person ist ebenso das Subjekt der Meditation, wie sie ihr Objekt ist; in der Meditation als einer Aktreihe der Person wird die Person selbst gegeben – und zwar nicht die Person in abstracto nicht das Wesen der Person an sich, sondern dieses Wesen am konkreten Fall der meditierenden und in ihrer Meditation sich selbst erfassenden Person.“

⁴⁰ „In der Meditation erfahre ich mich als existierend nur für den Augenblick meines konkreten *cogitare*; über diesen Augenblick hinaus in den nächsten und weiter in die Zeit hinein trägt mich nur die Macht die mich erschaffen hat. (...) Der Akt der Kreation erfüllt nicht einen Augenblick der endlichen Zeit, sondern ist die stetig wirkende Kraft, die das Leben der Person dauernd erhält.“

„Zwischen“, between „world“ and God, in order to understand what a human person is.⁴¹

f) Imago Dei

Continuing his discussion of Descartes, Voegelin now reaches the point where the true identity of the human can be discussed within modern philosophy. He points out that in Descartes' meditation,

„By means of the sceptical suspension a sphere is isolated in which the essence of the person is to be sought. When this sphere is found, a new method of positive description can begin in which the frontiers, or limits (Grenze) of the finite person and that which lies beyond the finite person can be brought into focus (verdeutlicht). Here we find considerations of the type which we find in Scheler's discussion of the essence of Thou-evidence (Du-Evidenz). The ego finds empty spaces (Leerstellen), which point to a possible fulfilment. From the nature of these empty spaces one has a notion of the nature of the essence (Wesen) of the being which could fulfill them, without having concretely experienced this being. Longing, gratitude and acts of love point beyond the ego toward the need for fulfilment in a Thou. In experiences of this type I become aware of my person as a finite person; finite in the specific sense of being both limited (begrenzt) and open to other personal substances“ (*H.*, I. 12-13).⁴²

⁴¹ Max Scheler, *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, vol. 3, *Gesammelte Werke*, p. 187

⁴² „Durch die skeptische Suspension wurde die Sphäre isoliert in der das Personwesen zu suchen ist; und nun da es gefunden ist, kann ein neues Verfahren positiver Deskription einsetzen, in dem die Grenzen der endlichen Person und das was jenseits ihrer liegt, verdeutlicht werden. (...) Das sind Überlegungen von der gleichen Art wie Scheler sie anstellt, um das Wesen der Du-Evidenz aufzuhellen; das Ich findet in sich Leerstellen, die auf eine mögliche Erfüllung angelegt sind, und aus der Art dieser Stellen kann um das Wesen des Erfüllenden gewußt werden, ohne daß es je konkret erfahren wurde. Sehnsucht, Dankbarkeit, Akte des Liebens, des Forderns weisen über das Ich hinaus auf Erfüllungen durch ein Du, durch eine andere Person; und in Erlebnissen dieser Art vergewissere ich mich meiner Person as einer

Such a discussion can be found also in Scheler's descriptions of the relationship between humans and between the human person and God. In these acts, the „ego“ itself is left behind as „part of the world“. The ego can be objectified, the center of the person cannot. (*H.*, I. 8)⁴³

g) *The ground of community*

Since all persons are rooted „*in deo*“ and by means of this relationship enter into spiritual relationships with one another, Scheler's theory of the „Leerstellen“ has both religious and sociological implications. In order to understand the use that Voegelin later makes of this argument, we need to quote Scheler *in extenso*.

„It is impossible“, writes Scheler, „to form any judgement about concrete questions of community without touching on the fundamental questions, What is the nature of community? To what ends do its essential forms exist?“⁴⁴

It is an essential law, and not an empirical fact, he continues, that it is

„inherent in the eternal, ideal nature of an intelligent person that all its existence and activity as a spirit is *ab origine* just as much an outward-conscious, co-responsible, communal

endlichen und zwar als einer endlichen im spezifischen Sinn der zugleich begrenzten und gegen andere Substanzen von Personcharakter sich öffnenden.“

⁴³ Compare: Max Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, vol. 2, *Gesammelte Werke*, pp. 385-393

⁴⁴ „Es ist nicht möglich, über faktische Gemeinschaftsdinge irgendeiner Art sich ein Urteil zu bilden, ohne an die Grundfragen heranzugehen: Was ist das Wesen von Gemeinschaft überhaupt? Was ist das höchste Ziel aller Gemeinschaft und was sind die Ziele ihrer Wesensarten?“ Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, S.371

reality as a self-conscious, self-responsible, individual reality“.⁴⁵

As far as empirical experience is concerned, the realm of contingent being, there have indeed been „Robinson Crusoes“.

But

„... even a hypothetical spiritual corporeal being who had never been conscious of his fellows via the senses would ascertain his membership of a community, his ‘belonging’, precisely on account of a positive awareness that a whole class of intentions in his essential nature was craving and not finding fulfilment- all types of loving (love of God, of one’s neighbour,etc.), promising, thanking, entreaty, obedience, serving, ruling and so on. Hence this imaginary being would not say ... ‘I am alone in the world, I belong to no community’, but would realize that although he does not know the actual community of which he is a member, he does know that he belongs to one. Where there is an I, there is a we. Each ‘I’ belongs to a ‘we’.“ (E., 373-374)⁴⁶

⁴⁵ „Es gehört vielmehr zum ewigen ideellen Wesen einer vernünftigen Person, daß ihr ganzes geistiges Sein und Tun eben so ursprünglich eine selbstbewußte, eine selbstverantwortliche individuelle Wirklichkeit ist, als auch bewußte mitverantwortliche Gliedwirklichkeit in einer Gemeinschaft.“
Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, S. 371

⁴⁶ „Auch ein fingiertes geistigleibliches Wesen, das nie und nirgends seinesgleichen sinnlich wahrgenommen, würde eben durch das positive Bewußtsein des Unerfülltbleibens einer ganzen großen Gruppe von geistigen, zu seiner Wesensnatur gehörigen Intentionen, als da sind Lieben und alle seine Grundarten (Gottesliebe, Nächstenliebe usw.), Mitfühlen, Versprechen, Bitten, Danken, Gehorchen, Dienen, Herrschen usw., seiner Gliedschaft in einer Gemeinschaft und seiner Zugehörigkeit zu ihr gewiß werden. Ein solches fingiertes Wesen würde also nicht sagen: ‘Ich bin allein – allein im unendlichen Raume und unendlicher Zeit; ich bin allein auf der Welt oder allein im Sein überhaupt; ich gehöre zu keiner Gemeinschaft’, sondern es würde sich nur sagen: ‘Ich kenne die faktische Gemeinschaft nicht, zu der ich mich gehörig weiß’.“ Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen* S. 372

The spiritual ground in which the existence of the person is founded, is in Scheler's diagnosis, the basis for membership of universal community:

„Because we have an awareness, as original as the self-awareness with which it is inextricably associated, of our organic membership in a universal community of spiritual beings, one which we cannot disregard,“ he continues, „we have at the centre of our souls an urgent need and limitless pressure of spirit to transcend in thought, and aspire beyond in loving desire, not only our solitary, naked self but every one of the historically actual and sensually visible communities to which we belong; this implies in effect, when rationally determined, an urge to regard every actual community in its turn as the ‘organ’ of a still broader, more comprehensive and higher community of spirits. There is nothing clearer or surer to our hearts and minds than this: not one of these earthly communities (family, municipality, State, nation, circle of friends, etc.), would ever quite suffice to satisfy the demands of our reason and hearts, no matter what degree of perfection it might attain in history. But since all communities of this kind are communities not only of spirits but also of persons, this (in principle) boundless urge and the demand of reason for ever richer, more universal and higher community find only in one idea their possible conclusion and perfect satisfaction- the idea of communion of love and spirit with an infinite spiritual person who at the same time is the origin, founder and sovereign Lord of all possible spiritual communities as of all actual communities on earth. Just as certain kinds of love are implanted in the nature of our spiritual existence- kinds differentiated from the outset, before casual experience of their correlative objects, as emotional acts which demand fulfilment (love, for example, of children, parents, home, country)- so there is also a supreme kind of love, love of God, which we already feel and possess before we have a clear intellectual conception of the supreme being. That is why Pascal can say to God, ‘I would not seek thee, if thou hadst not already found me’.“

Scheler makes clear that only such a community can fulfil the true needs of humanity, and that against it all other associations which seek to form substitutes for it must be measured. He continues:

„We are equally clear in heart and mind that their intentions can be entirely fulfilled and satisfied only by this supreme and final union of love and reason in God, and that we are unable to envisage correctly the communities in which we know ourselves involved, unable to see them in a true light, until we are conscious of them against the divine background of this supreme and final community of all spiritual beings – until we see their shape against the illumination which only community with the personal God projects. In that community alone do peace and rest attend the endless questing of heart and mind beyond all finite visible communities: *Inquietum cor nostrum* (said Augustine) *donec requiescat in te*. It is in and through God that for the first time we are truly bound in spirit to one another. This is exactly the meaning of the ‘first’ and ‘greatest’ commandment (Mark 12.30-31), which merges self-sanctification and love of one’s neighbour in their common root, the love of God.“ (E., 374-375)⁴⁷

⁴⁷ „Vermöge jenes mit dem individuellen Selbstbewußtsein gleichursprünglichen und mit ihm wesensnotwendig zusammenhängenden Glied- und Organbewußtseins in einer unabsehbaren universalen Gemeinschaft geistiger Naturen, liegt im Kerne unserer Seelen eine notwendige Forderung und ein schrankenloses geistiges Drängen, in Gedanken und in geistigem Liebesverlangen nicht nur über unser einsames nacktes Ich, sondern auch über jede der bloß je historisch faktischen und sinnlich sichtbaren Gemeinschaften, denen wir angehören, hinauszugehen und hinauszuverlangen; das heißt aber auch: ein vernunftbestimmtes Drängen, auch jede dieser faktischen Gemeinschaften von geistigen Personen selbst wieder als ‘Organ’ einer noch weiteren, umfassenderen und höheren geistigen Gemeinschaft zu betrachten. Es ist nichts unserer Vernunft, nichts unserem Herzen klarer und gewisser, als daß uns keine einzige dieser faktischen irdischen Gemeinschaften (Familie, Gemeinde, Staat, Nation, Freundschaft usw.), auch in keinem Grade ihrer möglichen historischen Vervollkommnung, je ganz genügen und unsere Vernunft und unser Herz vollkommen befriedigen würde. Und da nun alle Gemeinschaften

III.

The religious act and political reality

We see then that in Scheler's philosophy, principally (essentially) the human person exists „*in deo*“ and through this relationship enters into spiritual relations with other human beings. The *res publica* is therefore a spiritual community

dieser Art nicht nur geistige Gemeinschaften sind, sondern auch Personengemeinschaften, so findet dieses im Prinzip unendliche Drängen und diese Verunftforderung nach immer reicherer, umfassenderer und höherer Gemeinschaft nur in einer Idee ihren möglichen Abschluß und ihr vollkommenes Genügen: In der Idee einer Liebes- und Geistesgemeinschaft mit einer unendlichen geistigen Person, die zugleich der Ursprung, der Stifter und der Oberherr aller möglichen geistigen Gemeinschaften, wie auch aller irdischen und faktischen ist. Wie überhaupt gewisse Liebesarten im Wesen unserer geistigen Existenz selbst angelegt sind – Arten, die sich nicht erst durch zufällige Erfahrung der zu ihnen gehörigen Gegenstände differenzieren, sondern von Hause aus schon differenziert sind als Erfüllung fordernde Bewegungen und Akte des Gemütes, als da sind z.B. Kindesliebe, Elternliebe, Heimatliebe, Vaterlandsliebe –, so gibt es auch eine höchste Liebesart, die Gottesliebe, die wir schon erleben und besitzen, ehe wir eine genaue Verstandesidee vom höchsten Wesen besitzen. Darum kann Pascal von Gott sagen: 'Ich würde Dich nicht suchen, wenn ich Dich nicht schon gefunden hätte'. Unser Herz und unsere Vernunft sind sich gleich klar und gewiß, daß nur diese höchste abschließende Vernunft- und Liebesgemeinschaft mit Gott ihre Intentionen voll zu erfüllen und sie voll zu befriedigen vermag; und daß wir die Gemeinschaften, in die wir uns einbezogen wissen, erst dann im rechten und wahren Lichte zu schauen und zu denken vermögen, wenn wir sie gewahren gleichsam auf dem göttlichen Hintergrunde dieser höchsten und abschließenden Gemeinschaft aller geistigen Naturen; und wenn wir sie gewahren aus der Lichtfülle heraus, die diese Gemeinschaft allein verleiht: Aus dem Lichte der Gemeinschaft mit dem persönlichen Gott. Hier erst ruht, wird still und friedereich das unendliche Drängen und der notwendige unendliche Gedankenfortschritt über alle endlichen sichtbaren Gemeinschaften hinaus: 'inquietum cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te'. In Ihm und durch Ihn sind wir wahrhaftig geistig auch erst unter uns verbunden. Dies eben meint das 'vornehmste' und 'größte' Gebot (Markus 12,30-31), Selbstheiligung und Nächstenliebe in die gemeinsame Wurzel der Gottesliebe einsenkend.“ Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, S. 373-374

under God. And the soundness or unsoundness of the *res publica* will be found in an examination of the God – or the Idol – in which the society and its members find their spiritual reality.

„Since the religious act is an essential endowment of the human mind and soul, there can be no question of whether this or that man performs it. The question can only be of whether he finds its adequate object, the correlative idea to which it essentially belongs, or whether he envisages an object, acclaiming it as divine, as holy, as the absolute good, while it yet conflicts with the nature of the religious act because it belongs to the sphere of finite and contingent goods.“ (E., 267)⁴⁸

Scheler's firm grasp of this point enabled him to make fundamental criticisms of the underlying direction of European society. In an essay of 1917, he based his argument on the insight that society, having lost its view of man as *imago Dei*, had placed faith in worldly idols. Under the general term „humanitarianism,“ Scheler summarized the course of Europe's spiritual errors from the end of the middle ages to the catastrophe of the First World War:

„Humanitarianism rebels against the first principle of the Christian commandment of love: 'Love God first above all things' - with the immediate corollary, 'Therefore love your neighbour in God, and always in reference to the highest good'... It rebelled against the commandment in successive periods of classical renaissance, in the age of 'humanism',

⁴⁸ „Da der religiöse Akt eine wesensnotwendige Mitgift der menschlichen geistigen Seele ist, kann gar nicht die Frage ergehen, ob er von einem Menschen vollzogen wird oder nicht. Es kann nur die Frage ergehen, ob er das ihm adäquate Objekt findet, das Ideenkorrelat, zu dem er wesensmäßig gehört, oder ob er auf ein Objekt zielt und es als heilig und göttlich, als absolutes Wertgut bejaht, das seinem Wesen widerstreitet, da es der Sphäre endlicher, kontingenter Güter angehört.“ Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, S. 261

and with special force during the Enlightenment. All these great movements worked to construct an ethos which isolates man from God and often indeed plays man off against God. Even where it leaves Christian values *in situ*, there is a change in the emotion and spiritual act called love of man or love of one's neighbour. What is primarily envisaged by the new 'love of man' (of man alone) is no longer his invisible spirit, his soul and his salvation, solidarily included in the salvation of all children of God, with his bodily welfare taking an incidental place as a condition of his perfection and happiness.“ (E., 367)⁴⁹

The Enlightenment, Scheler argued, had completed the process of the establishment of idolatrous substitutes for true community.

„It needed only to complete a piecemeal demolition of early Protestantism's topheavy structure of supernaturalism with its dangerous abandonment of the task of inbuilding God's kingdom into this intractable world; what then remained was pure humanitarianism, the picture of a mankind without a leader or pattern in its basic objectives. Left to the random impulse of its natural instincts, this mankind had lost with its common reference to God the highest warrant of its unity. As

⁴⁹ „Der Humanitarismus erhebt sich gegen den ersten Satz des christlichen Liebesgebotes 'Liebe Gott über alles' (und wie wir gleich hinzufügen: Liebe darum auch den Nächsten in Gott und stets in bezug auf das höchste Gut). Er erhebt sich dagegen in verschiedenem Maße und in verschiedener Weise innerhalb der europäischen Renaissance, des sog. Humanismus, und ganz besonders mächtig im Zeitalter der europäischen Aufklärung. Alle diese großen Bewegungen arbeiten am Aufbau eines Ethos, das Mensch und Menschheit von Gott isoliert, ja häufig den Menschen gegen Gott ausspielt. Auch da, wo die christlichen Werte festgehalten werden, ändert sich doch die Emotion und der innere geistige Akt dessen, was Menschenliebe oder Nächstenliebe genannt wird. Nicht mehr sein unsichtbares geistiges Teil, seine Seele und ihr Heil – solidarisch eingeschlossen in das Gesamtheil der Kinder Gottes – trifft jene neue sogenannte Menschenliebe und Nurmenschenliebe zuerst, und leibliche Güter und Wohlfahrt des Menschen nur soweit, als sie seine Vollkommenheit und Seligkeit mitbedingen.“ Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, S. 365

Augustine so long ago had seen, this was a theomorphous idea of man“ (E., 371).⁵⁰

The consequence of this turn from the ground of order, was – Scheler argued – the mass of competing „interests“ whose importance was assumed central in the ideologies of modernity. In its logical pursuit of the humanitarian ethos, the nineteenth century had gradually

„whittled down that idea of the uniformity of rational human nature into which the Enlightenment had gathered all concepts of truth and falsity, good and evil, right and wrong... What else remained? The idea of conflicting groups following their interests or instincts, be they races, nations, states or classes – a picture of fluctuating conflict of every kind, in which only one thing is of deciding importance: the brutal issue. Everything in the nature of an idea or norm, whether it be of morality or justice, which formerly was intended to govern the relationships of men, is now pressed into the service of these interests and instincts as a bludgeon, knife or other weapon: it becomes epiphenomenal, an old mask behind which group-egoisms pharisaically hide... The clearest and most accurate expression of this inner condition of Europe was... the ideological worlds of Darwin and Marx.“ (E., 372)⁵¹

⁵⁰ „Die Aufklärungsperiode brauchte also nur den stark überstiegenen einseitigen Supranaturalismus der frühprotestantischen Bewegungen und seinen gefährlichen Verzicht auf wahren Einbau des Gottesreiches in diese spröde Welt Stück für Stück wegzustreichen: Dann blieb der reine Humanitarismus, blieb das Bild einer im Grundziel des Menschentums führer- und vorbildlosen Menschheit zurück. Überlassen den zufälligen Schiebungen ihrer Naturtriebe, hatte diese Menschheit mit ihrer gemeinsamen Beziehung auf Gott auch die höchste Garantie ihrer eigenen Einheit verloren. Denn ein Theomorphismus ist die Idee des Menschen, wie schon Augustin erkannte.“ Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, S. 369-370

⁵¹ „Die zunehmend einseitig realistische und historische Bildung des 19. Jahrhunderts hat auch diese Lichtspuren allmählich beseitigt. Sie hat in streng konsequentem Fortgang des humanitaristischen Gedankens insbesondere jene Einheit der vernünftigen Menschennatur als Idee mehr

In the social sphere, as in every other, there was, Scheler implied, no middle ground between openness towards God and atheism:

„This law stands: every finite spirit believes either in God or in idols. And from it there follows this pedagogic rule of religion: the correct way of dispelling ‘unbelief’ is not that of guiding a man to the idea and reality of God by arguments external to his personal condition (whether by ‘proofs’ or by persuasion), but that of showing him...that he has installed a finite good in place of God, i.e. that within the objective sphere of the absolute, which he ‘has’ at all events as a sphere, he has, in our sense, ‘deified’ a particular good... In thus bringing a man to disillusion with his idol... we bring him of his own accord to the idea and reality of God. Hence, what I have called the ‘shattering of idols’ is the principal (and only) way to prepare the religious development of the personality.“ (E., 267-268)⁵²

und mehr aufgelöst, in welche das Zeitalter der Aufklärung alle Begriffe von Wahr und Falsch, Gut und Böse, Recht und Unrecht eingesenkt hatte. (...) Was blieb übrig? Die Idee kämpfender Gruppen, die ihren Interessen oder ihren Menscheninstinkten folgen, seien es Rassen, Nationen, Staaten, Klassen usw. – ein Bild wogenden Streites jeder Art, in dem nur noch eines entscheidet: der brutale Erfolg. Auch alles, was Idee, Norm, sei es der Moral, sei es des Rechts, heißen kann – was einst die menschlichen Beziehungen regieren sollte – ist nur mehr Keule, Messer, Waffe im Knechtsdienste dieser Interessen und Instinkte; ist Epiphänomen, ist Maske, hinter denen sich die Gruppenegoismen pharisäisch verbergen (...) Die Gedankenwelten von Darwin und Marx haben diesem inneren Zustande Europas den deutlichsten und wahrhaftigsten Ausdruck gegeben.“ Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, S. 370-371

⁵² „Es besteht das Wesensgesetz: jeder endliche Geist glaubt entweder an Gott oder an einen Götzen. Und aus ihm folgt die religionspädagogische Regel: Nicht eine äußere Hinführung des Menschen zur Idee und Realität Gottes (sei es durch sog. Beweise oder durch Überredung) ist der Weg, auf dem der sog. Unglaube zu beseitigen ist, sondern der an dem besonderen Leben jedes Menschen und jeder Klasse solcher Menschen sicher mögliche Nachweis, daß er an die Stelle Gottes, d.h. daß er in die Absolutosphäre seines Gegenstandsreiches, die ihm als Sphäre auf alle Fälle (‘gegeben’ ist, ein endliches Gut gesetzt habe – daß er ein solches Gut, wie wir sagen wollen, ‘vergötzt’ habe, daß er sich in es ‘vergafft’ habe (wie die alten

IV.

Voegelin's 'Political Religions': the shattering of the idols

Voegelin's last book before his enforced emigration from Austria in 1938, *The Political Religions*⁵³ draws both on Scheler's insight concerning the positive nature of the religious act, and his declaration of the necessity of „shattering“ idols as the basis for a religious criticism of National Socialism.

Augustine's „*inquietum cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te*“, which Scheler had made the guiding principle of his philosophy of religion, is also formulated by Voegelin in his sentence: „The human experiences his existence as being that of a creature and therefore questionable (fragwürdig).“ (PR. 10) The problem of the questioning heart finding peace in God or failing to complete the religious act (undertaking it with inadequate means) and therefore coming to rest in an idol, is expressed in the pair of opposites, the „open“ and the „closed“ soul.

„For one person, the doors of his being are wide open for a view of all levels of being, from inorganic nature up to God.

Mystiker sagten). Indem wir also einen Menschen zur Enttäuschung über seinen Götzen führen, nachdem wir ihm durch eine Analyse seines Lebens 'seinen' Götzen aufgewiesen haben, führen wir ihn von selbst zur Idee und Realität Gottes. So ist der einzige und erste, die Dispositionen für jedes religiöse Werden der Persönlichkeit erst schaffende Weg der Weg, den ich 'Zerschmetterung der Götzen' genannt habe.“ Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, S. 261-262

⁵³ Eric Voegelin, *Die Politischen Religionen*. Ausblicke, Stockholm: Berman-Fischer 2nd ed. 1939. My translations follow, with a few changes: *Political Religions*, translated by T. J. DiNapoli and Peter Emberley, edited by Barry Cooper (Lewistown, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1986.) Citations in the text are given in brackets as PR, followed by the pages in the English edition: thus (PR., 4).

The world opens wide for him, its contents form into a meditative (durchdachtes) relationship to one another to form an order of being, in which the order of value of the levels of being are a hierarchical order of being itself; and as answer to the question concerning the ground of being, to an order of creation. A maximum reception of reality combines with a maximum of rationality in ordering and relating and culminates in the dogmatic ordering (Durchbildung) of the spiritual-religious experiences in an Idea of God, such as the occident developed in the analogia entis. Another has only narrow glimpses into reality, perhaps only one: of nature, of a great man, his Volk, humanity- that which he sees becomes the realissimum, the „Most-real“ (Allerwirklichste); it takes the place of God, and thereby obscures everything else – also, and most importantly, God.“ (PR., 12-13)⁵⁴

The question of ‘shattering the idols’ is taken up in the last chapter of *The Political Religions*. Here Voegelin gives detailed attention to symbols current in the political world around him which, he realizes, are the correlatives of and expression of, an incomplete act of meditation. He writes:

„We want to descend ... to the forces which create the symbolic forms“ (PR., 70)

⁵⁴ „Dem einen stehen die Tore seiner Existenz weit offen für den Blick über die Stufen des Seins von der unbelebten Natur bis zu Gott; die Welt entfaltet sich ihm weit, ihre Inhalte treten in ein durchdachtes Verhältnis zueinander, sie schließen sich zu einer Seinsordnung, mit der Wertordnung der Seinsstufen zu einer Rangordnung, und als Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Grund des Seins zu einer Schöpfungsordnung. Ein Maximum von Aufnahme der Wirklichkeit verbindet sich mit dem Maximum an Rationalität in der Ordnung und Verknüpfung und wird gekrönt von der dogmatischen Durchbildung des geistig-religiösen Erlebnisses in einer Gottesidee, wie sie das Abendland in der analogia entis entwickelt hat. Dem andern sind nur karge Blicke in die Wirklichkeit vergönnt, vielleicht nur ein einziger: auf die Natur, einen großen Menschen, sein Volk, die Menschheit – das Gesehene wird ihm zum Realissimum, zum Allerwirklichsten, es rückt an die Stelle Gottes, und verdeckt ihm dadurch alles andere – auch, und vor allem, Gott.“
Eric Voegelin, *Die Politischen Religionen*, Peter J. Opitz (Hrsg.), München 1993, S. 16-17

For this purpose he chooses the poems of Gerhard Schumann, „Lieder vom Reich“ as embodying

„one of the strongest expressions of politico-religious stirrings. They enable us to follow the movements of the soul out of which the symbols and the historical reality of the innerworldly community are built. As religious stirrings they have their roots in the experience of creatureliness; but the „*Realissimum*“ in which they find salvation is not, as it is in the Christian experience, God, but the Volk and the brotherhood of sworn comrades and the ecstasies are not spiritual (*geistig*), but that of instinct and find their outlet in the blood-intoxication of the deed (*Blutausch der Tat*).“ (*PR.*, 70-71)⁵⁵

He finds that the stirrings induced by the feeling of creatureliness are experienced by the poet Schumann as „abandonment“ and the loneliness of one locked into himself. The soul breaks out of this cold loneliness to unite with the divine whole.

„United in the stream of the brotherly flow of the world (mit dem Strom brüderlichen Weltfliessens) the soul flows into the totality of the Volk (das Ganze des Volkes). ‘I lost myself and found the Volk, the Reich’“ (*PR.*, 71).

The Führer has received God’s command and carries it to his Volk for their salvation:

„... and climbing down he carried the torch into the night. Millions bowed to him in silence, saved. Pale as morning, the

⁵⁵ „Einer der stärksten Ausdrücke politisch-religiöser Erregungen. Sie machen es möglich, den Seelenbewegungen nachzugehen, aus deren Stoff sich die Symbole und die geschichtliche Wirklichkeit der innerweltlichen Gemeinschaft aufbauen. Sie haben als religiöse Erregungen ihre Wurzeln im Erlebnis der Kreatürlichkeit; aber das Realissimum, in dem sie sich erlösen, ist nicht, wie im christlichen Erlebnis, Gott, sondern das Volk und die Bruderschaft der verschworenen Gefährten, und die Ekstasen sind nicht geistig, sondern triebhaft, und münden im Blutausch der Tat.“ Eric Voegelin, *Die Politischen Religionen*, S.58

heavens flamed. The sun grew. And with it grew the Reich'.“
(PR., 72).⁵⁶

So, Voegelin points out, despite the political success of the movement, the poet and his sworn brothers find no peace. Their interest lies deeper than the mere attainment of political power. For Schumann now speaks the following prayer:

„Don't let it happen, that I set up house.
Don't let it happen, that I be satisfied and call for peace.
Throw me into every despair and unease of the heart.“
(PR., 73-74).⁵⁷

It is not, Voegelin points out, the political victory which fulfills the intention of the poet's heart,

„but the deed itself. And the pain dealt to the enemy, should fall back on the doer of the deed himself: 'And when you strike, strike into your own heart'; the friend must be destroyed, even as the enemy is destroyed, until complete isolation is reached. (...) The naked, pointless deed and self-destruction are acts of mystical dissolving of the self and communion with the world to the point of letting go in the intoxication of blood: 'The deed was good, when you redden it with blood'.“ (PR., 73-74).

At night they dream of the Führer:

„From their steps one hears the judgement of blood. In their souls they carry the Grail. Servants of the Führer, both guardians and avengers. It burns in them, and with them grows the Reich.“ (PR., 75).⁵⁸

⁵⁶ „... Und niedersteigend / Trug er die Fackel in die Nacht hinein. // Die Millionen beugten sich ihm schweigend. / Erlöst. Der Himmel flammte morgenbleich. / Die Sonne wuchs. Und mit ihr wuchs das Reich.“ Eric Voegelin, *Die Politischen Religionen*, S. 59

⁵⁷ „Laß es nicht zu, daß ich mich häuslich einrichte. / Laß es nicht zu, daß ich satt werde und zur Ruhe mahne. / Stoß mich in jede Verzweiflung und Unruhe des Herzens.“ Eric Voegelin, *Die Politischen Religionen*, S. 60

⁵⁸ „Aus ihren Schritten hallt das Blutgericht. / In ihrer Seele tragen sie den Gral. / Knechte des Führers, Hüter und Rächer zugleich. / In ihnen brennt,

Let us compare this form of religious experience, which Voegelin identifies as central to the intentions of National Socialism, with that of Augustine. Both have the *cor inquietum* as their starting point. But neither the poet Schumann, nor his brothers, nor their leader, seek personhood „in deo“, but rather the elimination of unbearable loneliness – first in the loss of self in brotherhood which, in its turn, seeks both destruction of enemy and friend, and at last self-destruction. The symbolism of Schumann is the exact opposite of the symbolism of the Christian *imago Dei*; the extinction of personhood itself. By examining the idolatrous symbols of the human being who has inadequately completed the spiritual act, one can appeal to those who identify with such symbols to reflect once again. But one can do no more than point to the idols and make this appeal. For every discussion of religion is confined to the „pointing to“ function of negative theology, to the attempt to awaken the spirit of one’s partner in discourse to „see“ for himself. If the spirit does not awaken and begin its own meditative search, nothing can be done. The positive conceptual description of that which the spirit is not prepared to understand falls upon deaf ears.

V.

**Review: Augustine and Scheler in Voegelin's writings,
1930 - 1938**

As we have seen from the study of the *Herrschaftslehre* in section II above, Voegelin in 1930 – with books X and XI of Augustine's Confessions as the *terminus ad quo* and Max Scheler's philosophy of religion as the *terminus ad quem* – demonstrated the basic form of philosophical thinking in which the person finds himself, the *amare mundum et deum in deo*. The *imago Dei* has its being in participation, on the part of the human individual, in the spiritual acts of God. This experience takes place in the „Zwischen“ between finite „world“ and infinite God.

Although the human actions, due to finite being dwelling in soul and body, may be indexed in space and time, the noetic acts themselves, the personal realm of „meaning“, cannot be said to „exist“ in the spatio-temporal continuum. Neither spiritual-intellectual acts, nor the person, can be reified and experienced as „objects“. Therefore, in order to be understood, a meditation, as a series of spiritual-intellectual acts, must be committed by the individual seeking knowledge of reality. There are no „results“ of meditations which can be inter-subjectively examined and judged by humans who have not taken the same meditative way. Nor have meditations „results“ for the meditating person which can become his possession. Meditation is the act in which the spirit attains openness to the ground of being by becoming this openness at the center of the self. This state, the „open soul“, can through *superbia* and *amor sui*, be lost again.

Crucial then to this state is the opening of the soul: in the center of the spirit, an experience takes place which resists reification into „objects“ and which is constitutive for the being of the person. It follows that for Voegelin, a philosophical anthropology which conceptualizes the structure of the world can be of only secondary importance. It is therefore clear that Voegelin's reception of Max Scheler's philosophy of religion was a more important element in his own philosophical development than his reception of Max Scheler's philosophical anthropology. At the border of transcendence the language of philosophical anthropology must yield to the language of religious symbolization. And, as Voegelin's reception of Augustine and Max Scheler has demonstrated, the human person is this border (Grenze) to transcendent being.

Further, it is evident that this key insight, and the further insight that it is the *unio mystica* with God which constitutes the primary experience of community in which all other communities are rooted, enables the diagnosis of Voegelin's last work before his emigration, *The Political Religions* to be developed. Meditation as the basic form of philosophizing, and the person as *imago Dei*, remain of fundamental importance throughout Voegelin's philosophical career. The completion of the meditation as laid down by Augustine and explicated by Max Scheler is the experience which leads to the mode of being which Voegelin terms the „open soul.“ The open soul is also the dynamic yardstick for measuring the possible derailments which take place in the inadequately performed meditation, the notion of the so-called „immanence“ of the human or the temptation on the part of humans to see themselves as „gods“.

VI.
Epilogue: Scheler as a silent teacher in meditation,
1943 - 1966

More than ten years after writing the *Herrschaftslehre*, in a letter to Alfred Schütz in 1943, Voegelin again spoke of the meditation as the basic form of philosophical thinking.

„Descartes' meditation is in principle a Christian meditation in the traditional style; it can even be further classified as a meditation of the Augustinian type, and has been performed hundreds of times in the history of the human spirit since Augustine. The anonymous author of the *Cloud of Unknowing* (a meditation of the fourteenth century) has formulated the classic theme of the meditation in the following sentence:

‘It is needful for thee to bury in a cloud of forgetting all creatures that ever God made, that thou mayest direct thine intent to God Himself.’

The annihilation of the world *per gradus* from the level of corporeal being through to psychic being in order to reach the point of transcendence in which the soul, to speak in Augustine's words, can turn to God in the *intentio*, is the goal of meditation. This meditation is primarily a process in the biography of the individual who performs it, and the experience at the point of transcendence in the *intentio* is of short duration. Secondly the process can be expressed in language symbols, thereby creating the literary form of meditation. In the re-performing (*Nachvollzug*) of such a literary meditation a new, original meditation can take place in the mind of the reader“.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Eric Voegelin, „Brief an Alfred Schütz über Edmund Husserl“, *Anamnesis: Zur Theorie der Geschichte und Politik*, (Munich: Piper, 1966), p. 33; „Letter to Alfred Schutz on Edmund Husserl“, in: *Faith And Political Philosophy: The Correspondence Between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, 1934-1964*, edited and translated by Barry Cooper and Peter Emberley (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), p. 31

It is clear that, in contrast to the position taken in the *Herrschaftslehre*, Voegelin no longer recognized in Edmund Husserl's work a contribution to this basic form of philosophizing. Husserl, Voegelin now held, had failed to penetrate to the deepest level of the Cartesian meditation, the „ego as the anima animi, in the Augustinian sense, whose *intentio* does not turn to the *cogitata* but toward transcendence“.⁶⁰ Instead, Husserl confined himself to criticizing the psychologism in Descartes' concept of the ego and focusing on the transcendental ego in its turn toward the contents of the world. Yet, it is only in the sense of the meditation which Husserl failed to grasp that the problem of philosophy, as opposed to that of mere knowledge of the world, becomes thematic:

„In the transcendence of the Augustinian *intentio* ... (the) 'I' is simultaneously certain of itself and of God (not in a dogmatic sense, but in a mystical sense of transcendence in the Ground). And only from this assurance can the egological sphere in Husserl's sense be founded, with its *intentio* going to the opposite direction toward the *cogitata* – whatever form this assurance may then receive in metaphysical speculation“.⁶¹

Husserl, Voegelin now writes, „has isolated the egological problem from the Cartesian meditative complex“ because Husserl has

„never performed an original meditation himself. He has historically adopted the reduction of the world from the cogitating ego and cannot therefore ground his own transcendental philosophical position from an original bestowing metaphysics. The limit he never gets beyond is the

⁶⁰ Voegelin, „Brief an Alfred Schütz über Edmund Husserl“, p. 35; „Letter to Alfred Schütz on Edmund Husserl“, p. 33.

⁶¹ Voegelin, „Brief an Alfred Schütz über Edmund Husserl“, p. 35; „Letter to Alfred Schütz on Edmund Husserl“, p. 33.

founding subjectivity of the ego: but where the ego gets its function of founding the objectivity of the world from subjectivity remains not only unexplained but inevitably is hardly touched on. Instead of the higher founding in the experience of transcendence, there enters the founding in the intramundane particularity of one of the epistemological problematics established by Descartes“.⁶²

With his soul closed to transcendence, Husserl

„has taken the way out in the immanence of a historical problematic and with the greatest care blocked himself off from the philosophical problem of transcendence- the decisive problems of philosophy. For this reason, then, there come from a philosopher of rank what appears to be the curiosities of interpretations of history through the telos revealed to him; for this reason the justification of his position as functionary of this telos; for this reason the inability to find the Archimedean point, which he could not find for himself, in the philosophy of others; for this reason the apparent inhumanity in the humiliation of his predecessors; and for this reason – I would also believe – the constantly preparatory character of his work.“⁶³

Following the Second World War Voegelin spoke of the meditation with reference to Plato and Aristotle. Historically, he went back to a time before Augustine. In this connection, he no longer referred to the relationship of his endeavour, to that of Max Scheler. In 1966, as Voegelin prepared his letter of 1943 to Alfred Schütz for publication in *Anamnesis. Zur Theorie der Geschichte und Politik*, he crossed out the sentence of the original in which he had referred to Max Scheler. It occurred, as it had in the *Herrschaftslehre*, in a discussion of Descartes' third meditation. Voegelin pointed

⁶² Voegelin, „Brief an Alfred Schütz über Edmund Husserl“, pp. 35-6; „Letter to Alfred Schütz on Edmund Husserl“, pp. 35-36.

⁶³ Voegelin, „Brief an Alfred Schütz über Edmund Husserl“, p. 36; „Letter to Alfred Schütz on Edmund Husserl“, p. 36.

out the similarity between elements of the meditation and Max Scheler's analysis of the religious act:

„Thus the existence of God is not logically concluded, but, in the experience of the finitude of human nature, the infinite is given. (Similar in the problematic is Scheler's interpretation of longing and other related experiences in which a *negativum* is positively given.) God cannot be in doubt, for in the experience of doubt and imperfection, God is implied. In the limit-experience of being finite there is given, alongwith this side of the limit, beyond.“

In the published *Anamnesis* text, the parenthetical sentence concerning Scheler was dropped.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, although Scheler is no longer referred to in connection with the meditation here, it is clear that certain essential insights made by Scheler, which had been expressed in Voegelin's unpublished *Herrschaftslehre* and then applied in *The Political Religions*, remained an integral part of Voegelin's thought. The meditation as the basic form of philosophizing was performed in 1930 in Voegelin's reception of Augustine's *Confessions* and Max Scheler's philosophy of religion.

⁶⁴ Voegelin Archive, Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, Box 72.15. The original typescript of the letter, page 20, reads: „Das Dasein Gottes wird also nicht erschlossen, sondern in der Erfahrung der Finitheit des menschlichen Wesens ist das Infinitum gegeben. (Ähnlich in der Problematik, Scheler's Deutung von Sehnsucht und ähnlichen Erlebnissen, in denen ein Negativum positiv gegeben ist). Gott kann nicht im Zweifel sein, denn im Erlebnis des Zweifels und der Imperfektion ist Gott impliziert. In der Grenzerfahrung des Finitseins ist mit dem Diesseits das Jenseits der Grenze mitgegeben.“ The text I have quoted – without the parenthetical sentence concerning Scheler – is found in *Anamnesis. Zur Theorie der Geschichte und Politik*, p. 35.

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