VOEGELINIANA

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

— No. 91A —

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Political Ideas and Movement
in Post-War Austria

Eric Voegelin
The Change in the Ideas on Government
and Constitution in Austria since 1918

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Am 19. Juni 1937 erschien in der Wiener Zeitung *Neue Freie Presse* ein längerer Artikel, der unter dem Titel „Oesterreich und die Studienkonferenz", über Sinn, Zweck und Thema des bevorstehenden Treffens informierte, wie auch über Details der österreichischen Beteiligung. In ihm hieß es:

> „In der Woche vom 28. Juni bis zum 3. Juli findet in Paris die zehnte Sitzung der Internationalen Studienkonferenz – zum ersten Male unter Beteiligung Oesterreichs – statt. Die Internationale Studienkonferenz ist ein Organ des Völkerbundes und bedient sich des Institutes für geistige Zusammenarbeit in Paris als ihres Sekretariates. Die Konferenz organisiert in Zwei-Jahr-Perioden Studien über ein Thema von internationaler Bedeutung. Der Studienabschnitt, der mit der kommenden zehnten Sitzung schließt, hatte zum Gegenstand ‚Peaceful Change', die friedliche Regelung der Fragen, die zu internationalen Konflikten Anlaß geben könnten. Der Gegenstand ist in einer Reihe von Unterthemen gegliedert, von denen im besonderen hervorzuheben sind: Bevölkerungs- und Wanderungsfragen, Kolonial-, Rohstoff- und Absatzfragen, die zwischenstaatlichen Verfahren friedlicher Regelung und das Donauproblem.
>
> Die Arbeit wird in der Form organisiert, daß in den verschiedenen Staaten einzelne qualifizierte Institute oder nationale Koordinationskomitees, denen mehrere Institute angehören, die von der Konferenz gestellten Themen bearbeiten, wobei sie ihr besonderes Augenmerk auf die Beschaffung des Materials aus ihrem eigenen Land zu richten haben. Oesterreich hat sich an den Arbeiten bis zum Herbst durch die Konsularakademie und das Institut für Konjunkturforschung beteiligt, seit diesem Zeitpunkt durch das Oesterreichische Koordinationskomitee, dem außer den beiden genannten Instituten das Institut für politische Oekonomie und Gesellschaftslehre, die Lehrkanzel für Völkerrecht, das Institut für Statistik der Minderheitsvölker, das Seminar für Wirtschafts- und Kulturgeschichte der Wiener Universität und die Hochschule für Welthandel angehören."

Der Artikel schloss mit der Feststellung:

> „Die intensive Teilnahme Oesterreichs an den Arbeiten ist durch die Munifizenz der Rockefeller Foundation möglich gewesen. Das Oesterreichische Koordinationskomitee ist auf der Konferenz für die völkerrechtlichen Fragen durch Professor *Dr. v. Verdroß,* für die volkswirtschaftlichen Fragen durch Professor *Morgenstern*, für die

soziologischen Fragen und die Verwaltung durch den Sekretär des
Komitees vertreten." [1]

Als Autor des Artikels zeichnete der Sekretär des Oesterreichischen
Koordinationskomitees für Internationale Studien, Universitäts-
professor Dr. Erich Voegelin. Zusammen mit Professor Otto Brunner
und Dr. Gregor Sebba war Voegelin zugleich auch Mitglied einer
Studiengruppe, die für die Konferenz eine dreiteilige Studie zu den
politischen Ideen und Bewegungen Österreichs vor und nach 1918
vorbereitet hatte.

Während sich der einleitende Text von Brunner mit den politischen
Ideen der Habsburger Monarchie befasste, lieferte die Studie von
Sebba einen Überblick über die politischen Ideen und Bewegungen
in der Nachkriegzeit sowie über die Umformungen, die sie infolge
der Zerschlagung des Habsburger Reiches und der krisenhaften Er-
eignisse von 1933/34 erfahren hatten. [2] Gegenstand des Textes von
Voegelin waren schließlich die Ideen zu Regierung und Verfassung
seit 1918 sowie die Verbindung zwischen politischen Ideen und dem
Problem der Existenz Österreichs als unabhängiger Staat. Getragen
wurden die drei Memoranden von der Überzeugung ihrer Autoren,
dass dem Einfluss ideologischer Faktoren auf die Situation in Öster-
reich eine mindestens ebenso große Bedeutung zukomme wie den
wirtschaftlichen Faktoren und insofern eine nähere Untersuchung
rechtfertige.

Obwohl die drei Memoranden in der Literatur gelegentlich Erwäh-
nung fanden, blieben sie doch weitgehend unbeachtet. Das galt auch
für den Text Voegelins, der vor einiger Zeit im Rahmen seiner
Collected Works veröffentlicht wurde. [3] Diese Vernachlässigung ist –

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[1] Wien, *Neue Freie Presse*, 19. Juni 1937.

[2] Der Text von Gregor Sebba wurde mir freundlicherweise von Dr. Peter
Pirker zugänglich gemacht; für die Erteilung des Copyrights danke ich der
Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia.

[3] *The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin* (= *CW*)*,* Vol. IV: *The Authoritarian
State. An Essay on the Problem of the Austrian State*. Translated from the
German by Ruth Hein; ed., with an Introduction by Gilbert Weiss; historical
Commentary on the period by Erika Weinzierl, Columbia/London:
University of Missouri Press, 1999, S. 367-379. Siehe dazu auch: Erich

bezogen auf die Voegelin-Forschung – einerseits verständlich, liegt mit dessen 1936 veröffentlichter Schrift Der autoritäre Staat doch eine detaillierte Analyse über das „österreichische Staatsproblem" vor.[4] Andererseits weisen die drei Memoranden doch eine Reihe nicht unbeachtlicher Vorzüge auf: Sie bringen die politische Situation in Österreich knapp und scharfsinnig auf den Punkt, konzentrieren sich auf die weltanschauliche Dimension, sprechen Problemfelder an – etwa die Positionen der österreichischen Parteien und der Antisemitismus in Österreich –, die in der Schrift Voegelins nur gestreift wurden oder gänzlich unerwähnt blieben. Vor allem aber sind sie dem Ereignis, das nun immer stärker seine dunklen Schatten voraus wirft – dem „Anschluss" Österreichs an das deutsche Reich – zeitlich näher, als es Voegelins Autoritärer Staat war, den dieser schon Ende August 1935 abgeschlossen hatte. Während die Autoren in ihren Kernüberzeugungen weitgehend übereinstimmen, setzen sie in ihren Analysen doch je nach Temperament sowie gesellschaftlichem und geistigem Hintergrund unterschiedliche Akzente. Ob man soweit gehen kann, wie Peter Pirker, der in seiner Studie über Gregor Sebba zu dem Ergebnis kommt, dass dieser „im Grunde eine demokratische Gegenposition zu Voegelin und der Politik des „Austrianism" bzw. der „österreichischen Mission formuliert" habe[5], sei dahingestellt. Richtig ist allerdings, dass Voegelin in Österreich zum damaligen Zeitpunkt und in der Situation der 30er Jahre noch nicht die Voraussetzungen für die Einführung der Demokratie als gegeben ansah und insofern dem Ständestaat durchaus positiv gegenüberstand.[6]

Voegelin, Die österreichische Verfassungsreform von 1929, in: *Zeitschrift für Politik*, XIX. Band, Januar 1930, Heft 9, S. 585-615.

[4] Erich Voegelin, *Der autoritäre Staat. Ein Versuch über das österreichische Staatsproblem*. Wien: Julius Springer, 1936. Eine von Günther Winkler besorgte Neuauflage erschien 1997 im Springer-Verlag, Wien.

[5] Peter Pirker, „Musst immer tun wie neugeboren". Zum politischen Denken und zur antinazistischen Praxis des Wiener Sozialwissenschaftler Gregor Sebba.. *Voegeliniana – Occasional Papers*, No. 91B

[6] Eric Voegelin, *Autobiographical Reflections*. Ed., with an Introduction by Ellis Sandoz, Baton Rouge/London: Louisiana State University Press, 1989, Kap. 12 und 13, S. 38-44. Dt.: Eric Voegelin, *Autobiographische Reflexionen*. Hrsg. v. Peter J. Opitz. München: Fink, 1994, S. 56-63.

Die Veröffentlichung der Memoranden von Sebba und Voegelin in der Voegeliniana-Reihe erscheint aus den genannten Gründen somit als durchaus gerechtfertigt. Dass auf den einleitenden Text von Otto Brunner verzichtet werden musste, ist bedauerlich, war angesichts des beschränkten Raumes, der hier zur Verfügung steht, aber leider unvermeidlich. Der Verzicht ist allerdings sachlich insofern zu verschmerzen, als Brunner vor allem das geistige Vorfeld beleuchtet, auf die uns hier vor allem interessierende Entwicklungen in den 1930er Jahren aber nicht näher eingeht. Es sind jedoch weniger die Memoranden von Sebba und Voegelin, deren Veröffentlichung im Rahmen der Voegeliniana-Reihe einige Worte der Erläuterung bedürfen, als die Art und Weise, in der dies geschieht: nämlich in enger Verbindung mit der oben angesprochenen Studie von Peter Pirker – also gewissermaßen in Form eines Doppel-Heftes. Im Mittelpunkt der vorzüglich recherchierten und anschaulich geschriebenen Studie Pirkers stehen Gregor Sebba, seine Aktivitäten vor dem „Anschluss" sowie in den Jahren darauf im Exil. Für die Aufnahme dieser Studie in die Voegelinana-Reihe gibt es gute Gründe. Sie stellt nicht nur Gregor Sebba als einen der drei Autoren des österreichischen Textes vor, er ist auch ein wichtiger Baustein für eine längst überfällige Biographie Sebbas, der im Laufe der Jahre zu einem der engsten Freunde Voegelins wurde. Darüber hinaus vermittelt Pirker interessante Einblicke in das gesellschaftliche und geistige Umfeld vom Wien der 1930er Jahre, in die Welt der westlichen Nachrichtendienste, vor allem aber in die Aktivitäten des österreichischen Exils in England und in den USA.

Der eigentliche Grund für ihre Einbeziehung ist jedoch ein anderer: Im Vergleich mit Sebba wird auch Voegelins Verhalten in dieser Zeit klarer – und in mancher Hinsicht auch problematischer.[7] Während Sebba durch sein aktives Engagement „an der Schnittstelle von

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[7] Zu den Aktivitäten Voegelins in diesen Jahren siehe die Einleitung des Herausgebers von *CW* 29: *Selected Correspondence 1924-1949*. Ed. with an Introduction by Jürgen Gebhardt, Columbia/London: University of Missouri Press, 20099, S. 1-68; sowie Hans-Jörg Sigwart, *Das Politische und die Wissenschaft. Intellektuell-biographische Studien zum Frühwerk Eric Voegelins*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005, Teil III, sowie Michael Ley, Gilbert Weiss, *Voegelin in Wien. Frühe Schriften 1920 – 1938*, Wien: Passagen Verlag, 2007.

Exilpolitik, Propaganda und nachrichtendienstlicher Tätigkeit"[8] mit großer Energie und ohne Rücksicht auf Leib und Leben den Widerstand gegen das nationalsozialistische Deutschland aufnahm – dabei allerdings an der politischen Kurzsichtigkeit und Borniertheit westlicher Diplomatie und Politik ebenso scheiterte wie an den gegen ihn gerichteten Kampagnen des monarchistischen und konservativen österreichischen Exils –, hatte Voegelin eine andere Form des Widerstands gewählt. In den Jahren vor dem „Anschluss" hatte er sich in seinen Schriften zunächst um eine Diagnose der gesellschaftlichen und verfassungsrechtlichen Situation Österreichs bemüht und auf deren Grundlage die autoritär-ständische Verfassung von 1934 befürwortet – sowohl als Etappe auf dem Weg zu einem nationalen Identitätsbewusstsein, das Österreich aufgrund seiner Vergangenheit als Vielvölkerstaat fehlte, wie aber auch zur Verteidigung der Unabhängigkeit Österreichs gegen das nationalsozialistische Deutschland. Nach seiner Flucht Mitte September 1938 in die USA hatte er sich dann verstärkt den Ursachen zugewandt, die zum Aufstieg der totalitären Bewegungen geführt hatten. Gegenstand seiner Studien war nicht nur die historischen Entstehungs- und Entwicklungsprozesse, sondern vor allem das Wesen dieser Bewegungen und ihrer Ideologien.

Genau genommen hatte Voegelin diese Studien schon bald nach seiner Schrift Der autoritäre Staat begonnen und im Sommer 1938 unter dem Titel Die politischen Religionen einen ersten Zwischenbericht vorgelegt. Obwohl auf die deutsche Entwicklung konzentriert, betrachtete Voegelin diese nicht als einen Sonderfall, sondern – wie er Ende 1938, nun schon in den USA, im Vorwort zur ihrer zweiten Auflage bemerkte – als Symptom einer „schweren Krise", in der sich die westliche Welt insgesamt befand. Deren tiefere Ursache er eine bis ins Mittelalter zurückreichenden geistigen Entwicklung: nämlich in einer „Säkularisierung des Geistes", hervorgerufen durch die „Trennung eines dadurch nur weltlichen Geistes von seinen Wurzeln in der Religiosität".[9] Viele Jahre später,

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[8] Ebd., S. ___

[9] Erich Voegelin, *Die politischen Religionen*. Wien: Bermann-Fischer, 1938. Im Folgenden zitiert nach der 3., mit einem neuen Nachwort versehenen Auflage, erschienen bei Fink (München), 2007, S. 6.

1958, klagte Hannah Arendt in ihrem Buch Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft:

> „Es liegt im Sinne unserer gesamten philosophischen Tradition, daß wir uns von dem radikal Bösen keinen Begriff machen können, und dies gilt auch noch von der christlichen Theologie, die selbst Satan noch einen himmlischen Ursprung zugestand, wie von Kant, dem einzigen Philosophen, der in der einzigen Wortprägung seine Existenz zumindest geahnt haben muß, wenngleich er diese Ahnung in dem Begriff des pervertiert-bösen Willens sofort wieder in ein aus Motiven Begreifliches rationalisierte. So haben wir eigentlich nichts, worauf wir zurückfallen können, um das zu begreifen, womit wir doch mit einer ungeheuerlichen, alle Maßstäbe zerbrechenden Wirklichkeit konfrontiert sind."[10]

Genau das aber, die Unordnungsphänomene der Zeit auf den Begriff zu bringen, hatte Voegelin in den *Politischen Religionen* versucht, und die Sprache, die er dabei verwendete, weist bemerkenswerte Ähnlichkeiten mit der von Hannah Arendt auf, etwa wenn er in seinem Vorwort schreibt:

> „Eine religiöse Betrachtung des Nationalsozialismus muß von der Annahme ausgehen dürfen, daß es Böses in der Welt gebe; und zwar das Böse nicht nur als einen defizienten Modus des Seins, als ein Negatives, sondern als eine echte, in der Welt wirksame Substanz und Kraft. Einer nicht nur sittlich schlechten, sondern religiös bösen, satanischen Substanz kann nur aus einer gleich starken religiösen guten Kraft der Widerstand geleistet werden. Man kann nicht eine satanische Kraft mit Sittlichkeit und Humanität allein bekämpfen."[11]

Der letzte Satz richtete sich gegen Thomas Mann, der in den Politischen Religionen, die Voegelin ihm geschickt hatte, zuviel „Objektivität" sah und „moralischen Widerstand" vermisse.[12] „Ich will [...] nicht sagen, daß der Kampf gegen den Nationalsozialismus nicht auch als ethischer geführt werden soll", konterte Voegelin, „er wird nur – nach meiner Ansicht – nicht radikal geführt, weil die radix, die Wurzel in der Religiosität fehlt." Voegelin beließ es aber nicht bei der

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[10] Hannah Arendt, *Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft*. Frankfurt a.M.: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1955, S. 670 f.

[11] Voegelin, *Die politischen Religionen*, S. 6.

[12] Brief vom 18. Dezember 1938 von Thomas Mann an Eric Voegelin. Zitiert in: Voegelin, *Die politischen Religionen*, S. 144:

Diagnose, sondern deutete auch den Weg an, der aus dieser geistigen Krise herauszuführen versprach. Und da er als deren wesentliche Ursache die Trennung des Geistes „von seinen Wurzeln in der Religiosität" diagnostiziert hatte, sah er konsequenterweise auch dessen Gesundung in einer „religiösen Erneuerung". Dabei aber sei es jedem möglich, so Voegelin, „bereit zu sein und das Seine zu tun, um den Boden zu bereiten, aus dem sich der Widerstand gegen das Böse erhebt." In diesem Sinne wertete er seine Arbeit an einer radikalen Freilegung der geistigen Wurzeln der totalitären Bewegungen als seinen Beitrag zur Überwindung – und die Politischen Religionen als ein livre de resistance.

Der Essay Die politischen Religionen war ein erster Versuch Voegelins, die modernen Massenbewegungen und das Wesen der westlichen Modernität auf den „Begriff" zu bringen, keineswegs aber sein letzter. Und auch die Beschäftigung mit der westlichen Krise und seine Suche nach Wegen zu ihrer Bewältigung endeten nicht mit dieser Schrift, sondern beherrschten weiterhin seine Arbeiten. Wenngleich Voegelin den Begriff der „politischen Religionen" später wieder fallen ließ, und auch den Begriff „Gnosis", der in den 1950er Jahren an seine Stelle getreten war, im Laufe der Jahre deutlich modifizierte und sich stattdessen bemühte, die Phänomene geistiger Ordnung und Unordnung in einer Philosophie des Bewusstseins auf den Begriff zu bringen, so stand seine Arbeit auch weiterhin im Schatten der Erfahrungen der 1930er und 1940er Jahre und der aus ihnen gewonnenen Überzeugung von der Verpflichtung des Philosophen zum Widerstand gegen das Böse.

Wir wissen nicht, ob Gregor Sebba die Politischen Religionen kannte, und sofern dies der Fall war, was er von der Schrift hielt und ob er die von Voegelin geäußerte Überzeugung teilte, dass eine Gesundung der westlichen Welt nur durch eine Revitalisierung der religiösen Wurzeln des menschlichen Geistes erfolgen konnte. Da er sich jedoch als „gläubiger Atheist" verstand, ist Letzteres wenig wahrscheinlich. Bekannt ist hingegen, dass Sebba die Entwicklung des Voegelinschen Werkes nicht nur über die Jahre aufmerksam verfolgte und zu einem seiner einfühlsamsten und von Voegelin hoch geschätzten Interpreten wurde, sondern auch, dass er sich in seinen eigenen Anschauungen mit

Voegelin weitgehend einig wusste[13] – auch wenn sich die Form des militanten Widerstands, die er in den 1930er und 1940er Jahren gewählt hatte, tiefgreifend von derjenigen Voegelins unterschieden hatte.

Peter J. Opitz

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[13] Einige seiner wichtigsten Aufsätze zu Voegelin finden sich in: *The Collected Essays of Gregor Sebba. Truth, History, and the Imagination*. Ed. by Helen Sebba, Annibal A. Bueno, Henricus Boers, Baton Rouge/London: Louisiana State University Press, 1991.

GREGOR SEBBA

**POLITICAL IDEAS AND MOVEMENTS
IN POST-WAR AUSTRIA**

"Le reste c'est l'Autriche"
(Clémenceau at St. Germain)

1)   From the Struggle of Nationalities into the Vacuum

When the Habsburg monarchy of Nationalities broke into pieces
there was a bundle of provinces, parties and leaders who had never
before formed a united political body and who were rather reluctant
to do it now. Their political ideas, attitudes and techniques had been
formed in pre-war times under the incessant pressure of the main
problem of the old state: how to give play to the rising national spirit
of the nationalities without destroying the supernational frame
keeping them together. Post-war Austria was formed by parties and
leaders with a firmly established past but without any trends towards
what suddenly became their future. Involuntarily they started with
co-operation but failed because their particularist feelings were never
overcome by an urgent necessity for unification. It was the imminent
danger of a National Socialist conquest in 1933 which entirely
changed the situation. But up to 1933 almost nobody wanted that
state to exist in its given form although nobody actually aimed at its
dissolution. The population did not feel like living in a firmly estab-
lished state. It regarded Austria as something provisional, but it kept
quiet because provisional settlements are by tradition durable though
uncomfortable.

In pre-war Austria parties had to take part in a double fight: in the
struggle between nationalities and in the political struggle within
each nationality. These fights could go on quite recklessly because
there was a common tradition, a monarch as a common symbol, and
a common army, keeping the centrifugal parts of the communities
together. When the German parties and leaders were left as residue
after all the other nationalities had departed they kept that inheritance

of recklessness although there was no more common bond of tradition, no more common symbol and common army.[14] Thus the new state started in preestablished disharmony.

2.   The Leading Political Ideas

The three main groups of political ideas are: Catholic, Nationalist and Socialist. It is significant that in 1918 there was no more liberalism left. The only liberal remainders were formed by certain small social sets in Vienna which controlled the leading papers but never exercised any political influence.

a)   Catholicism.

The Austrian Catholicism is certainly the most Austrian of all political powers in the country. It is most intimately connected with the Habsburg tradition. In the monarchy the church was naturally supernational. Political Catholicism therefore meant primarily the Conservatism of Church, feudal aristocracy and dynasty. But soon a radical catholic movement developed which got the support of the urban petty-bourgeois and the rural middle class. The "Christian Socialist Party" was according to its program Christian (which meant Catholic), Social (meaning anticapitalist), antiliberal and anti-Semitic. Its great leader in pre-war times, Dr. Lueger, was the perfect type of a People's Tribune mixing slogans and sentiments as necessary for coaxing the masses. His "anticapitalism" and "antiliberalism" responded to the uneasiness which industrialism had created among the middle classes. His anti-Semitism was not racial and therefore not very consequent, as his famous saying shows: "It is I who decide who's a Jew!".

In 1918 the party was no longer homogeneous. On one side it represented the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois interests, on the other side it was the representative of the farmers, and beyond that it had to represent the interests of industry and the "catholic course" of the Church. There was a Christian Socialist worker's movement too which was

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[14] The post-war Austrian army was not recruited by general conscription; it never represented the whole community but was an object of party fights for patronage.

rather unimportant. But its leader had strong influence within the party and he (together with the leaders of the farmers' organisation) was decidedly democratic and antifascist, while industry, bourgeoisie and Church rather favoured the antidemocratic movements.

The party always nourished traditional and monarchist feeling. It was federalist and it never supported the Anschluss wholeheartedly although some of its leaders, especially the younger ones, were devoted German nationalists.

Technically the party had that most important sense of holding the key positions in spite of changing political situations. Its technique of slowly advancing by using other movements and parties for its political purposes and recklessly dropping them afterwards proved superior to all other attempts at seizing power (Machtergreifung).

The old stock of ideas was renewed by the influence of Romantic Socialism and of the social theories of the Church. Romantic Socialism was based on the Catholic idea of the ideal society combining natural harmony with justice and brotherly love. That rather vague idea had not the power either to change Catholic politics or to rally the workers to the Catholic party. Today the combination of Romantic Socialism with monarchism is regenerating monarchism. The idea of a "Social Emperor", that is to say of a Habsburg Emperor ruling with a socialist Chancellor beside him is making some progress within the working class.

The younger generation of catholic statesmen was strongly influenced by Rhineland Catholicism. They found the relation between Rhineland Catholicism and, for instance, Bavarian Centrum Catholicism very similar to their own relations to the Christian Socialist party which had become a mere "screen" for economic, not to say capitalist interests. They were attracted by the Socialist reforming spirit and the religious fervor of the Rhineland "Have-nots". Dollfuss and Schuschnigg are no longer "Christian Socialists" of the old type. But they are not revolutionary either. Their social ideas aim at reforming society both by moral and technical means rather than by fundamental change.

The national feeling of Austrian Catholicism was always ambivalent. There is a relic of the Great-Austrian ideology of Austria's "mission" of reconciling the nationalities in the Danube basin, but Great-Ger-

manism was also quite deeply rooted. When Dollfuss fought against the Anschluss he had to fight against himself. But the more Germany identified herself with National Socialism the more Catholicism and Austrianism merged, and slowly the idea gained ground that the merger might become decisive and final.

All these recent developments affected only the small group of young leading Catholics. Catholicism provided the slogans for the new paths of Austrian politics. It became almost inseparably entangled with the present state of things. But it failed to arouse strong public sentiment and the enthusiasm necessary for a real "reformatio in capite".

b)   Nationalism.

Nationalism in Austria naturally means German nationalism. It started in opposition to the Metternich era of absolutism and was therefore liberal and constitutional. After 1866 it turned more and more Pan-German and Anti-Austrian. In the 80's a new radical nationalism developed known as the "Schönererbewegung", which added anti-Semitism and anticlericalism full of hatred to the idea of a Pan-German renaissance:

> "Ohne Juda ohne Rom
> Bauen wir Germanias Dom!"

This antisemitism was racial and therefore uncompromising. The Church or, as they said, "Rome" was regarded as one of the worst enemies of Germany. Anticlericalism meant destroying the dominating position of the Church in Austria's political life. Today "Schönerertum" in this form has died out. Ludendorff being a living museum sample of that special shade.

In post-war Austria the parliamentary nationalist party, the "Grossdeutsche Volkspartei" was the weakest of the three leading parties although in the last pre-war parliament they held more seats than any other German party. The program of the party was Great-German, antiliberal, anticlerical, anti-Semitic, antimarxist. In fact the party merely represented the economic interests and political sentiments of a part of the bureaucracy and of certain groups within the middle classes, especially the rural intelligentsia and the teachers. Later on a

second nationalist party developed which represented the non-Catholic minded agrarians and farmers.

Much more important than these parliamentary bodies were and are those nationalist organisations which are not concerned with actual politics and therefore conserve the radical nationalistic and anti-Semitic feeling. First of all there is the "Deutscher Schulverein Südmark", an organisation for supporting German minority schools all over the nationally disputed districts of the monarchy, and a centre of activistic nationalist tendencies. There are furthermore the "Deutschvölkische Turnvereine" doing thorough educational work on very radical lines. And there are the university students most of whom always represented radical anti-Semitic and anticlerical nationalism although the opposing powerful catholic student organisations offered tremendous patronage facilities.

The younger Pan-Germanism, based on radical antiliberalism and anti-Semitism, had almost entirely replaced the older form of more or less liberal Pro-Germanism. But it never became a mass movement and it never developed slogans appealing to the masses. It remained confined to certain social sets by the fact that it was almost entirely recruited from the university student corporations and the rural intelligentsia gathered in the "Turnvereine". Thus all these nationalist groups were of rather sectarian type: communities kept together by a common creed, anxiously avoiding contamination by the touch of the wicked outside world, and investigating the racial or political origin of their actual environment with almost religious zest. That sectarian attitude was certainly due to the fact that German nationalism within the Habsburg monarchy held a minority position, fighting a losing war against the rising non-German nationalities which had won the lead, and against the supernational forces within the German nationality itself. Their anticlericalism was due to the fact that Catholicism for a very long time had played the game of the conservatives of all nationalities and remained the representative of the supernational Great-Austrian idea. The German nationalists had been brought up fighting in petty warfare for every inch of national ground while the great leadership shifted to other nations. So they were bound to confine themselves to keep alive an ardent nationalist spirit which had no practical outlet. That explains their sectarian "habitus".

It was not by chance, therefore, that only in post-war Germany and by an Austrian the victorious form of German nationalism was formed. Hitler was full of Schönerer's ideas. Beyond adding the aristocratic "Nordic" idea to the more general "Aryan" one there is hardly anything new in his system. But he realized the sectarian "habitus" of German nationalism. His National Socialism differs from Austrian German nationalism as a religion differs from a sectarian creed: by its general appeals and by the broadness of its formulations. Hitler combined the sectarian zest, radicalism and aggressiveness of the Austrian "völkische Idee" with an imperialist feeling which could never arise in Austrian herself among the Austrian kinsfolk outside the great body of the nation.

The more Hitler's movement proved to be successful, the more Austrian nationalism was bound to merge into it. The more sectarian it was the more easily that merging went on. Today there is no more German nationalism in Austria outside Hitler's National Socialism. And National Socialism is no longer Austrian in any sense of the word. The Austrian "Nazis" feel themselves part of the Third Reich. There is no longer even a question of "Anschluss" as the joining of one German state to the other. Austria of today contains a large activistic group of population belonging mentally and politico-religiously to another state.

C)   Socialism.

Before the Socialist break-down in 1933 Socialism in Austria simply meant the Austrian Social Democratic Party. "Austromarxism" was certainly the finest Marxist party outside Russia. But even this Marxist model party, we must trace back to the Habsburg times, in order to understand it. Under the Habsburg rule it adopted its form of thinking and organisation as well as its tactics, which later on proved to be unchangeable and fatal.

It is perhaps more than a historical accident that the roots of the most ardent Marxist party on German soil touch those of its counterpart, German National Socialism. In 1882 Victor Adler, a Jewish physician, together with some friends wrote a national political program, the "Linzer Programm", which was to be published in Schönerer's review "Deutsche Wörter". Later on Schönerer became anti-Semitic and de-

veloped the radical ideas which took possession of Hitler during the Viennese years, while Adler became the organiser of the Austrian Social Democratic Party, and its greatest statesman. From its very beginnings the party developed along the lines of divisions over the national question. National antagonism was powerful enough to split the internationalist Socialist movement into national branches. Long before the war the party was primarily concerned with the national, not the social question. It looked for an enduring settlement of the national disputes and thus developed a most advanced program for national order within the Habsburg monarchy which is still the foundation of the minority theories in Europe.

The party was opposed both to the monarchy and the "capitalist state". But it had a strong sense of responsibility towards the common bond which kept the various nations together. Victor Adler and Karl Renner, the leading spirits of the elder Socialist generation, fought for co-operation between the nations within the frame of a common state. The supranational state – provided that it was based on democratic freedom and on a certain degree of national self government and autonomy – was even regarded as superior to the pure national state. Therefore this generation was ready to compromise and co-operate with the other nationalities.

During the first three years of the world war that attitude became obsolete. The non-German nations turned away from the idea of a common supranational state. The principle of self-determination worked as a disintegrating force, and the idea of co-ordinating national differences under a territoriality limited supranational order was repudiated as backward. The Austrian Germans, once the leading nation, were threatened with involuntary isolation.

It was the younger generation of Socialists who drew the conclusions from this situation. Otto Bauer, the most able leader of what later on became "Austromarxism", developed the national program of the "Left Wing". He rejected bluntly Renner's sensible theory of "the necessity and superiority of a supranational state", which was fully adequate to the historical and economic conditions of the Danube basin. Instead of it he applied the right of self-determination to the German Austrians too and consequently proposed the formation of an independent state with Anschluss as the natural and even desirable

outlook. It was significant and decisive that the division between left and right wing took place about the national and not the Socialist program. When, almost immediately before the breakdown in 1918, the party adopted the "left" program, its unity was saved. The opposition between the more conservative and the more radical members had been overcome and the radical wing had won. But the issue had been a national one and this had saved the party from entering into disintegrating discussions about the Socialist program. Thus Communism had lost all further chances before it had even started. But the victory of the democratic left wing decided at the same time certain other facts which chiefly contributed to the party's final defeat.

This victory first handed over the absolute leadership to Otto Bauer, and Otto Bauer was a brilliant intellectual, whose doctrinarism, however, lacked the ultimate ruthlessness required for political success. The left victory destroyed the feeling for the "necessity and superiority" of a supranational – and, as we may add, a supra-party – state, this inducing the party to refuse co-operation for merely doctrinaire reasons. It destroyed the personal political reputation of Karl Renner, who was regarded as old fashioned although he represented the fine qualities of those statesmen who were accustomed to deal with the calmness and foresight necessary in a multinational state. When the great leader Victor Adler died on the very day before the proclamation of the new state, Austromarxism entered the new period with all its outstanding features: with its tremendous organizing power, with a most doctrinaire and intellectual leadership; with a perilous familiarity with the destructive methods of national disputes, combined with a weakened (not to say vanished) sense of the "necessity and superiority" of a political community superior to party fights.

To understand Austromarxism it is however necessary to distinguish clearly between that what its enemies took it for, what it claimed to be and what it really was. Was the party "revolutionary" and "bolshevist", and did it fight the "class war" with the aim of establishing a "dictatorship of the proletariat" as its enemies supposed and as the program partly suggested?

Certainly the party was not "revolutionary" although it liked revolutionary words and attitudes. A really revolutionary spirit shows itself not in safe times but in times of crisis. The Austrian Socialists some-

times did their best to bring about crises but then always failed to release the full stream of revolutionary feelings. They were handicapped by too great an intellectual insight combined with too much sense of responsibility. Sometimes they drove very closely towards revolution but, the decisive point being reached, they always shrank back because they understood the real issue far too well to preserve the brutal blindness of real revolutionaries. Furthermore Victor Adler's admirable political education had rendered the workers conscious and responsible. Outbreaks were despised both by the leaders and the organized workers. But revolutions are not made by people who take any given situation for granted. The Socialists administered "red" Vienna on rather conservative lines, and their fear of losing control over it prevented them from taking too dangerous steps. But all this hardly "revolutionary" spirit was concealed by revolutionary phraseology, by a policy of incessant pin-pricking and by endless theoretical debates on revolution, the real intention of which was to reconcile their theoretical attitude with their practical one by proving that "the revolutionary situation had not yet arisen."

The idea of "class war", too, had a special meaning. There was no chance of destroying the bourgeois class as in Russia. So class war meant a lasting tension between Socialist and non-Socialist, and a thorough isolation of the working class, a socialist "state within the state". In1926 Otto Bauer had the very unfortunate idea of introducing "dictatorship of the proletariat" into the party program, more for the sake of completeness than for anything else. The program claimed the right of resort to force in case the "Bourgeoisie" should prevent a democratic turn towards socialism by "a deliberate starvation of economic life" (a memory of the hunger days of 1918/19!), by "violent rebellion" or by "conspiracy with foreign counter-revolutionary forces". As a matter of fact the Socialists were always prepared but never willing to resort to civil war while their opponents thought them willing and therefore slowly prepared for their annihilation.

The Austrian workers are concentrated in Vienna and in a few industrialist districts. Therefore the strategical idea of the Socialists was to control the country by controlling the factories and the railways. Thus the general strike became the symbol of their alleged power.

"Alle Räder stehen still,
Wenn Dein starker Arm es will!"

But in July 1927 the general strike broke down and the Socialists could not even maintain full control over the railways. From that moment on it became perfectly clear that they had either to look for co-operation or fight a decisive battle with the impetus and risks of real revolution. But that fact was not recognized before it was too late. When in 1928 Karl Renner proposed coalition, Otto Bauer scornfully rejected this rescuing proposition as "undignified prattle".

It can hardly be denied that the Austrian Socialists had developed an extremely modern and efficient method of leading masses. This method was based upon the Marxist theory that history is fully determined. Therefore, the theory continued, every actual stage of political affairs bears a double aspect: from outside it appears accidental but it has its definite place with the determined course of social history. A political decision is right if it takes account of that position. Political leadership therefore consists firstly of a right analysis of the underlying historical position of the given situation and secondly of making the masses conscious of that situation so that they willingly accept the policy taken up by the leaders. This theory explains a great deal of the technique adopted by the party. The technique consisted, firstly, of expressing the actual situation in Marxist terms, secondly of localizing it within the supposed broader course of social evolution, and, thirdly, deriving practical tactic decisions from the analysis. Leading the masses meant educating them towards a full understanding of that process, making them aware of the "laws" of evolution and mobilizing them in favour of the political decisions which they had been trained to adopt as lawfully determined ones. Thus leadership meant a thorough educational system and a heavy burden of incessant intellectual discussion which certainly weakened the feeling for mass appeals and the ability to find an approach to the minds of those to whom Marxist terminology sounded strange.

As all this educational and discussion work emanated from a small set of leaders the machinery was always under their full control. Any influence upon the decisions of that set had to be fought for on the intellectual field, and no personal attack was possible because the

leaders were hidden behind the screen of "objective necessities". The system of education and discussion made the Socialist workers the most intelligent, conscious and best organized political group throughout the country. But at the same time it isolated them mentally and sentimentally from the other classes. The party supported that isolation by every means, providing to its followers not only a political creed but every necessary facility down to Socialist sport, chess, bicycling and rabbit breeding thus destroying the non-political connections between the workers and their compatriots.

But such an intellectual method of mass leading, although making the party a wonderfully exact instrument in the hands of the leaders, must be completed by certain decisiveness within the leading set. The followers were trained to understand the decisions made and to admit their infallibility by understanding them as the right measures in a determined situation. But what if the position of the party grew worse and worse in spite of that series of infallible and most reasonable decisions? What if the leaders, who had held back the revolutionary will of the masses for years and years, proved to be too weak and cautious for taking decisive measures and using the tremendous good will offered to overflowing by the masses? That situation indeed developed from 1932 on. The party began to understand that its leaders had manoeuvred it into an unbearable situation without proving their ability to make ruthless decisions. So the party lost active public support just when it needed it most. In 1934 the Socialist population watched angrily but passively the bloody fall of "red" Vienna.

2.   The "Trauma of Birth"

Beyond the rival parties there was nothing, no strong government and no powerful and respected state. To understand that one must again go back to the embryonic stage of the new German-Austrian State. If psychoanalysis is correct, a baby during the process of birth gets a first and tremendous psychic shock. After maternal nutrition has ceased and before independent breathing starts there is a moment of intoxication, of actual deadly danger, of first collision with an inimical outside world causing that shock. The same thing happened to the small republic coming into being in October and November 1918. Suddenly

it was cut out of the maternal economic body which hitherto had fed it. It was not yet able to provide itself with food and coal. In those dark days Austria was actually threatened by the danger of starvation. The first declaration of independence starts with great words: Right of Self-determination, Independence, Free Dealing with the Other Nationalities. But it ends with the promise to meet the actual danger of starvation by undertaking the "necessary negotiations". Those "necessary negotiations" meant exactly the same as most of Austria's negotiations with foreign powers did: bartering political rights for food and money.

Even that barter was no free dealing. It was executed under the threat of foreign intervention, both military and economic. Being the unhappy centre of a restless continent the country was treated without any respect for the dignity of an independent state. The threat of military invasion was a heavy burden upon the shoulders not only of the government but of the party leaders as well. The undignified spectacle of Chancellors going begging abroad, of foreign troops massing at the frontiers, of diplomatic calls at the Ballhausplatz, of highly paid foreign "counsellors", of vetoes threatened by even the most incompetent foreign newspapers, poisoned the civic feeling of the people. No responsible statesman could forget the "trauma of Austria's birth", and so they did their best to prevent any similar situation, thus necessarily reinforcing the feeling of humiliation which – unlike Germany – did and could not assume the form of ardent nationalistic indignation but created thorough disinterest in and contempt of the "state Austria".

Another consequence of the "trauma of birth" is the curious inclination towards economic instead of political formulations. The vital question of independence was treated under the slogan "Lebensfähigkeit" (ability to live). The gulf between Socialists and antisocialist parties was marked by the problem of "Mieterschutz" (legal fixation of rents and rights of tenants). Even the terminology and the choice of the problems which were taken for decisive shows how much politics were regarded as unnecessary and unimportant.

Certainly the disrespect for government was partly due to the fact that the parties had established themselves as the real sovereigns. But that was only a consequence of the other fact that nobody really wanted the

state, that there was no political idea beyond the party ideologies and that everyone knew the state to be a product of foreign pressure. How could people have positive feelings for such a political being? Civic hatred and humiliation from abroad mutually reinforced each other, and if a government wanted to set things right it first had to stop both sources of disrespect. The authoritarian course has done away with the internal party quarrels, but a positive respect for Austria as an independent state depends on the definite proof that the country is willing and able to check any blackmailing attack from abroad. It is remarkable that pro-Austrian propaganda entirely misses that point.

3. <u>Anschluss</u>

The more important a political issue is the more mythical it becomes. Today one must go back to almost forgotten facts in order to give a realistic picture of the development of the Anschluss idea. That picture corresponds neither to the Anschluss myths nor to the "Austrian historic view" (Österreichisches Geschichtsbild) of the Anti-Anschluss movement.

German nationalism in pre-war Austria tended intrinsically towards union with Germany but regarded the Austrian Germans as pioneers of Germanism (Deutschtum) in the east. In 1918 that "mission" suddenly disappeared as there was nobody left to be the object of German cultural influence. But the powerful, heroic Reich of Bismarck had vanished too, and the nationalists in Austria looked anxiously at the democratic German republic staggering along an uncertain course which led through civil war, Bolshevist danger and further foreign humiliation. In the autumn of 1918 the Austrian population was fed up with ideas and illusions, and under the pressure of defeat, starvation and record unemployment, the economic interests ranged first. At the first elections for the new republican parliament the Great-German party, before the war, the strongest German party, was beaten and condemned to final insignificance.

The Catholic party was very slow in giving up its Great-Austrian and monarchistic attitude. Although they finally adopted the program of

"self-determination" with Anschluss as a possible and even desirable ultimate goal they never supported Anschluss wholeheartedly.

The driving force towards Anschluss was the Socialists. Their left wing had taken up that course as a result of cold rationalist considerations. The right wing did not approve before October 3, 1918. Not until ten days later did Otto Bauer start the first Anschluss campaign within the working class. He states himself: "The masses of working people at that time still faced the Anschluss idea with reserve, although Social Democrats had been its first proclaimers".

Although the constitutional declaration of the Provisional National Assembly on November 12, 1918 briefly stated: "German-Austria is an integral part (Bestandteil) of the German Republic" all great parties were rather reluctant about a total merger of the new state with the German republic. The western provinces opposed Anschluss for special reasons. Tyrol declared her "independence" and in the spring of 1919 protested against the repetition of the Anschluss declaration. In the small province of Voralberg a plebiscite was held on May 11, 1919, on the question of joining Switzerland or Germany, and the people voted with 47.000:11.000 votes against the Anschluss.

But Otto Bauer, being foreign secretary at that time, pursued an energetic and active Anschluss policy. He arrived at a secret agreement with Germany concerning the arrangements to be made in case of an Anschluss. The conditions were extremely favourable to Austria. The government furthermore hoped for the support or at least complacent neutrality of America, Great Britain and even Italy. But in Austria itself public opinion was divided. The Socialists considered a plebiscite for Anschluss but did not venture on it, because they feared that a strong counterpropaganda would render the result uncertain. Under French pressure the Allies took advantage of the indecisiveness. But it was only in the third and final draft of the peace conditions for Austria that the Anschluss veto was included.

After the final settlement of the Austrian question in St. Germain it became more and more clear that there was no hope for a closer connection between the successor states. Public opinion now fully realized that the Great-Austrian feeling was obsolete. The idea of

forming an independent state was disliked as well. From now on Anschluss was the dominant political ideal. In 1921 a series of plebiscites began, and Tyrol voted 98.8% for the Anschluss, Salzburg 99,3%. Further plebiscites were forbidden by the Entente. From then on until Hitler came into power Anschluss was the almost unanimous aim of the country.

Only certain Catholic circles – and very influential ones – remained reserved. Dr. Seipel never spoke clearly in favour of Anschluss. As early as 1932 the Catholic workers' leader spoke of the "rolling mark", suggesting that the Anschluss propaganda was paid from Germany. Catholic circles of young monarchists developed the ideology of "der österreichische Mensch", which later on was used to establish the little-Austrian idea.

In 1933 the great change came, slowly and reluctantly. The Great-Austrian idea is dead and is not even supported by the Habsburg monarchists. The Anschluss idea in its previous form is dead too. On one side a new little-Austrian idea is propagated, on the other side a part of Austria's population regards itself already as a part of the German Reich. The Anschluss question is no longer an issue between "Germany" and "Austria" but between the Nationalist Socialist Movement and its "enemies". The "Anschluss" idea has been replaced by the idea of the Third "Reich" which will never recognize any political autonomy for those groups of Germans abroad which politically lean towards Berlin.

4. <u>Parliamentarism and Democracy</u>

In 1918 the new state was founded by parties. They established a purely parliamentary regime which was in fact a party regime. The state was practically divided into shares belonging to the parties. As subsequent elections did not bring about major changes the parties were confirmed in their stubborn refusal of intimate co-operation. They felt themselves in almost exactly the same situation as the nationalities in pre-war Austria had been. So they used the parliamentary technique adopted under so different circumstance. One of the most disastrous techniques was the obstruction, another one which contributed very much to the growing disrespect for Parlia-

mentarism was the so called "Junktim". The debates were sometime conducted in a most undignified manner. Thus the people began to lose respect for Parliament altogether, and the parties did nothing to prevent that feeling from spreading within the masses. When at last the majority for the governing coalition shrank to a minimum and from one session to the next it became uncertain if the government could obtain the one decisive vote, when vital decisions were arrived at with an accidental majority of 81 to 80 and the fate of the government and the state depended upon the sickness of one member of Parliament, it was apparent that parliamentarism had come to a deadlock.

Thus outside the parties a strong antiparliamentary movement grew. Not even the Socialists were anxious about Parliamentarism when Dollfuss eliminated Parliament in 1933. They were anxious about democracy. But is was too late to save democracy. All parties had agreed that the "will of the nation" was actually misled by propaganda and pressure. The only way of mending the defect of democracy was to use Parliament for clever and responsible co-operation and leadership. This way had been neglected and the last chances of strengthening the government with the consent of all parties had been voluntarily missed. When the emergency arrived and the anti-democratic "Nazi" movement claimed its democratic right to power, the parliamentary democracy in Austria was bound to succumb.

5. Fascism

The Heimwehr movement was taken for Fascism by its adversaries and by many foreign observers. That was a mistake. The Heimwehr had started with a democratic program. In its beginnings it was anti-parliamentary, not antidemocratic. Later on its criticism turned against democracy in general. But the idea remained to re-establish "true" democracy by doing away with the rotten party system and the ridiculous Parliament, and by establishing a strong, uncorrupted governmental power. But even at that stage the movement was not fascist. There was no "charismatic" leader and no nationalistic enthusiasm. The Heimwehr never arrived at a clear idea of what to

do with the state Austria: It neither took the clear Anschluss course, nor replaced it by a genuine Austrian ideology. Thus its program remained ambiguous and the movement became the mere tool of people who knew what they wanted. At last it adopted the famous "Korneuburg Program" which sounded very radical and fascist. A few weeks later the leader, Prince Starhemberg, stated: "The program … is contentious and does not find full agreement among all followers, and that for easily intelligible reasons, for it is really very obscure and full of 'rhetoric'".

6. "Der österreichische Mensch", the Corporative State and the

    Illegals

The newly established German-Austrian state had been furnished like a hotel room, with ideas and rationalist allegories straight from the factory of reason. Soon the Catholic party attempted to replace them by "tradition". "Tradition" meant the symbolism of the Habsburg monarchy, the old uniforms, the old anthem, devotion to the Great-Austrian history. The Socialists strongly opposed it for two reasons. They considered the movement "reactionary", bringing back the illusions which covered the hated monarchic "absolutism"; and they felt that this kind of "Traditionspflege" and of "Österreichertum" was meant to separate the Austrians from Germany. As Karl Renner expressed it: "We are no nation, we never were and we never can become one. Why this spasmodic striving to play a special part in foreign politics (he meant the Italo-Hungarian friendship) when we can be nothing but a German tribe longing for return to the mother-country?"

It was the Great Catholic leader Seipel who first made the Ständestaat an actual political issue. When in 1933 the state of emergency arose, Dollfuss had the choice of going with the Socialists defending democracy in Austria in order to save it for a democratic Great-Germany to come, or he had to fight the "two front war" against Red and Brown in order to separate Austria from Germany. He took the second course and thus revived the feeling that Austria differed from Germany by her "mission" and by the character of her people. This Austrianism is, of course, a Little-Austrian one. There is no more talk about "carrying culture eastward". As compared to the fanatic nation-

alism of the "Nazi's" that Austrianism was and is weak, unemotional and unenthusiastic. Dollfuss created the "Patriotic Front" to be Austria's quasi-totalitarian organisation, but the Front was and is a vast and expensive organisation which fails to develop public appeal. The Ständestaat, being an organisation of economic interests, is no substitute for political leadership, and therefore plays no role whatsoever in the imagination of the people. The Austrians certainly began to feel different from the Germans, but an open counter-propaganda might yet endanger this rising feeling.

The true achievement of the authoritarian course in Austria consists in strengthening the power and authority of the government and in making the armed forces a conservative element in the hands of the responsible government. The resistance to the National Socialist attack has certainly augmented the respect paid to the government. The proof that for the first time since 1918 Austria had been able to resist foreign pressure was just the thing the country wanted to establish itself. But unfortunately that resistance had to be shown against the political goal of all her post-war longing. Had Austria defended her independence against any other country or power, an ardent Austrian nationalism would have been the consequence.

The present situation is characterized by the coexistence at the same time of governmental Austrianism with three illegal movements. The "Social Revolutionaries" are the remains of the Social Democratic Party and consist mostly of elder, politically well-trained workers. The second illegal movement are the Communists. After the Socialist crash in 1934 the schism became inevitable and it is true though paradoxical to say that the anti-marxist action of the government has enabled organised communism to take root in Austria. But as the Socialist are opposed to National Socialism and as they know that without fundamental political changes in Europe there is no chance for a Socialist Austria, they feel that some sort of co-operation on Austrian national lines may become necessary and possible.

The third illegal movement, the National Socialist Party, is decidedly anti-Austrian. It is merely the Austrian branch of the German Nazi party. As long as Germany remains imperialistic a reconciliation of the Austronazis with the present Austrian state seems practically impossible.

Conclusions:

Austria has been created against, or at least without, the will of the country. The parties which formed it had inherited an unfortunate disrespect for the needs of co-ordination and co-operation. Foreign humiliation reinforced the growing disrespect for parliament and government. The masses regarded the state as something provisional which would eventually merge with the German republic. When the independence of the country was threatened from within and without, the government established an authoritarian course which fulfilled the desire for stronger leadership and created a new middle-Austrian idea. It sacrificed thereby the ideal of Anschluss, the unite of feeling within the country and the old established organisation of political life.

From the point of view of Peaceful Change the question arises what the possible future of the state can be. Certainly Austria's destiny depends entirely on events abroad. It is almost certain, too, that in the long run it would be possible to find a form of political life enabling the Catholics and the non-Communist groups of Socialist workers to co-operate and to support unanimously an independent state. The powerful action of the Dollfuss and the Schuschnigg governments have certainly created some of the necessary conditions for that policy.

But the National Socialist question cannot be solved within Austria herself.

ERICH VOEGELIN

THE CHANGE IN THE IDEAS ON GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTION IN AUSTRIA SINCE 1918

Under the aspect of Peaceful Change, Austria offers a curious problem. While other countries are centres of unrest because they have got what they wanted and are trying to keep it against other claimants, or because they have not got what they wanted and are now trying to get it, Austria has been during the greater part of the last two decades a danger-spot of Europe because of its strong inclination towards non-existence.

This curious state of things expressed itself in the Austrian ideas on government and constitution. And the rather remarkable change which has occurred regarding these ideas since the Great War is an excellent indicator of the change of the internal political structure of Austria and the growth of a will to independent political existence.

The Austrian constitutional problem may be put in one sentence: Austria is a nationally uniform state without being a national State. The population of the present territory of Austria has never formed in history a political unit. Austria has a long and glorious history, but it is not the history of the present Austria as an independent body politic; it is the history of Austria as part of the mediaeval Empire or as an integral and dominating part of the old Austrian monarchy. The Germans of Austria have been during their history an Empire-building and colonising people; Vienna has been, up to the rise of the present Reich, the seat of the only German Great Power. And, when in 1918 the break-up of the old Monarchy ensued, the population on the Austrian territory was "left" as a "residuum". While the other succession States are products of an evolution towards national independence of the population on their territory, the Austrian population was never inspired by a will to independent national existence. Austria, when it was created after the War, had a population, but it did not have a people in the political sense of the word.

By the word "nation" or "people" we mean a social group possessed by the will to common and independent political existence; the two most important criteria for the existence of such a will are (1) a readiness to rank party interests and programs second, leaving the first place for the interests of common national importance; (2) a readiness to defend the common political existence against aggression. Of course, there will always be individuals and groups who do not fall in with this order values; and the criteria mentioned have, therefore, to be interpreted reasonably as meaning that, at any critical point of time, a sufficiently large part of the community is inspired by such a political will to make the weight of dissenting groups and individuals negligible.

II.

When we apply these criteria to the Austrian situation in 1918 and subsequent years, we find that our thesis of the Austrian population not being a people at that time, is correct. In the last weeks of October and first half of November 1918, the leaders of the parties informed the public frequently in a programmatic manner of their view of the situation and of the steps they had taken in order to create a satisfactory political status for Austria. A first page of these weeks is filled by the endeavour to create a Danubian Federation between the succession States including Austria. This attempt failing, the idea of the union with Germany, the "Anschluss", came to the foreground. It would, however, be a mistake to interpret this idea, at the time, as the ardent wish of the Austrian people. The pronounciamentos of the party leaders accompanying the Law of November 12, which proclaimed the union with the Reich, made it clear that this measure had been taken because the more desirable alternative of a Danubian Federation could not be realised. But the policy of joining the German Republic seemed inevitable because all parties agreed in the belief that, for economic reasons, an independent Austria could not exist. The will to non-existence as a political unit was expressed with clearness beyond doubt.

A similar lack of decision characterised the formation of the inner structure of the new State. The conservative parties were much in

favour of a monarchy, but they were hampered in pursuing this aim by the resistance of the socialist party as well as by external force. The socialist party, itself, had a right wing, represented by the Chancellor, Dr. Renner, who believed that the ideals of 1848 were now realised; and it had a left wing who believed in the dictatorship of the proletariat as the ultimate goal and considered the democratic republic as an interlude and first phase of evolution towards this aim. The democratic, parliamentary, republican constitutional instrument agreed upon by the parties in 1920 was the outcome rather of external necessities than of any positive will of the fathers of the new Austrian constitution.

III.

From the beginning, therefore, a discrepancy developed between the idea of government envisaged by the constitutional instrument of 1920 and the constitutional reality of the Austrian republic. The constitutional instrument was intended to create a democratic republic, meaning thereby a republic with a parliament as the representation of the people; the people was to be, according to the constitutional instrument, the last source of political power in the republic. Now, as there existed no such thing as an Austrian political people or nation, the parliament soon developed into an assembly of parties, opposed to one another on the cardinal point that the left wing party asserted the ideal of class war, while the several other parties were held together by the firm resolve not to become the victims of the class war waged by the socialists.

The Austrian population was divided along the party lines in a rather rigid way. The series of general elections proved that the party adherence of the individuals would not be shaken. Austrian politics lacked absolutely the elasticity of Western democracies, which arises from the fact that a sufficient number of citizens are capable of changing the party of their choice, so that the power of the parties can change, and a change of the parties representing the government is possible. The stability of party adherence and the discipline within the parties reached such a stage that a brilliant teacher of public law

was of the opinion that the election of single members of parliament was superfluous and that the system would work much more simply when the vote was given for a party only and it was left to the party leaders to compromise on the legislation and other State affairs, every party having in council the weight of the votes received at the last election; the members of parliament, the supposed representative of the people, being practically of no importance. This real constitution, of course, was incompatible with the ideas of the constitutional instrument, that is: the ideas of a free formation of political opinion, of an election of deputies according to the issues, of a formation of fractions within the parliament, of a free mandate, etc. The constitution in the working proved to be the permanent cleavage of the population into antagonistic stabilised parties, the absolute power of the parties over the members of parliament, the imperative party mandate, etc.

This period of discrepancy between the written and the real constitution of the country was characterised by a peculiar idea of government and constitution. The written constitution was considered as a formal instrument being at the disposition of the parties for the attainment of their private purposes. As the political force envisaged by the constitution, the people, did not exist, only a formal adherence to the constitution seemed necessary to the real forces, the parties, and the letter of the constitution was quite unscrupulously abused in open contradiction to its spirit. Especially the anti-democratic parties, in the beginning the socialist, later on also the national-socialist, considered the rights granted to political activity exclusively as instruments put at their disposition in order to destroy any rudiments of democracy which might exist. The anti-democratic parties created strong organisations with a numerous bureaucracy; they tried to organise their members in a "totalitarian" way by transforming their mental attitude and disposition on strict party lines and according to their "Weltanschauungen"; they created for that purpose very efficient educational systems; and, last not least, they organised private armies, which in the case of the socialist army was bigger and in some respects technically better equipped than the state-army. The socialist army, the so-called "Schutzbund", would have been an even more serious instrument than it actually proved to be in February 1934, but for the questionable qualities of some of its leaders.

There had been developing a "state within the State", or, rather, Austria was split up into several state-like personal organisations on the same territory, held together by external pressure under a common "constitution". In 1933 the split-up had gone so far, that as a matter of fact there existed besides the state-army a number of party-armies who participated in the short civil war of February 1934 and in the years of anti-Austrian warfare of the national socialist party: on the one side, the socialist Schutzbund and the S.A., on the other side, Heimatschutz (Starhemberg, Fey), Ostmärkische Sturmscharen (Dollfuss-Schuschnigg), and others.

This evolution has been favoured by a widespread attitude towards the constitution which, to a certain extent, had been a heritage of the old Monarchy. The old Austrian Empire had not been a national State either; and the role of the parties after 1918 was played before the War by the different nationalities within the Empire. A political attitude has been growing since the constitutional era of 1848, which might aptly be called "the administrative style". This is to say that the living forces of the old Monarchy, the nationalities, were using the constitution in a similar way to the parties in postwar Austria. The constitution was not a living force in itself, but a legal instrument applied by the neutral administration (The Emperor, the Government, Bureaucracy, and Army) and used by the collective forces of the nationalities only for ends which were not intended by the constitution itself. The constitution of the "administrative" style is not the heart of the political life of the people; it is not the symbol of its will to national existence, but rather a colourless set of legal rules used by the political forces living under them. In this situation, a curious idea of "legality" evolves; the groups cherishing it do not intend to live up to the constitution but rather to use the constitution as a technical instrument for the realisation of their political aims. This idea of "legality" was of considerable importance in the crisis of 1933/34, when the anti-democratic parties resented bitterly the measures taken by the government to preserve the existence of the State as "illegal", because acute examination of these measures could show that some of them did not comply with every letter of the written constitution. The decisive point of these reproaches, however, was the fact that they were made by the parties whose outspoken programme was the destruction of the constitution by any

means suitable for that end. The "idea of legality" of that period may be put in the phrase: that in the opinion of the anti-democratic movements the democrats were under an obligation to cling to the letter of the constitution until the anti-democratic forces were strong enough to do away with it. The rules of the constitution had to be observed, according to this opinion, although the social reality to which they should be applied was lacking. The "democratic" contents of the constitution should be the guiding rule for the government, in spite of the fact that there existed no Austrian "democracy".

IV.

The events of 1933/34, and especially the German Revolution, brought about a fundamental change in the Austrian political situation. The problem of the existence of the Republic as a whole as well as that of its organisation had been left in suspense up to that date, now events urged a decision. The existence of the State had to be preserved against national-socialist propaganda for a union with Germany; the inner structure had to be stabilised against the class-war ideology. The two exigencies were met by the authoritarian and corporative organisation of the State.

A few weeks after the "Machtergreifung" in the Reich, an incident of parliamentary procedure, which probably would have passed without consequences at any other time, made it possible for the Government to replace parliamentary legislation by delegated legislation of the Government itself. The Constitutional Court was prevented by a technicality from passing judgement on the constitutionality of governmental Orders. By these measures the real constitution of the Republic was transformed from government by parties to the authoritarian government of a single group, whose nucleus consisted of the former Christian-Socialist party and the so-called "Wehrverbände." The evolution of the constitution was marked by the following dates:

Legislative Power

1) March 1933 to April 30th, 1934: legislation of the government by Orders based on a Law of 1917, control by the Constitutional Court made impossible.

2) Since May 1st, 1934: Legislative and Constitutional Power conferred on the Government by the Law of April 30th, 1934, passed by the old Parliament; this Law is still in force and will remain so until the corporative organisation of the State is completed.

3) Since November 1934, a supplementary legislative power is given to the new legislative assembly (the Bundestag) organised by the Constitution of May 1st, 1934; this legislative power is to become exclusive when the corporative organisation is completed.

4) Power of legislation by governmental orders (Notverordnungen) conferred by the new constitution; will become practical only when the legislative power under 2) has come to an end.

B. Authoritarian Political Organisation

1) The Patriotic Front as founded by Chancellor Dollfuss in 1933; free political organisation to attract the forces in favour of the policy.

2) The First Law on the Patriotic Front, creating "Corporation of Public Law" with the executive right "to form the political will of the people"; May 1st, 1934.

3) The Second Law on the Patriotic Front making the Federal Chancellor ex officio Leader of the Front; May 20th, 1936.

C. The Parties

1) Activities of the Communist Party prohibited by Order of May 26, 1933.

2) Activities of the National Socialist Party prohibited by Order of June 19, 1933

3) Activities of the Social Democratic Party prohibited by the Orders of February 12 and 16, 1934.

4) Disarmament of members of parties whose activities were prohibited, and of their military organisations. Law of August 31, 1934.

The "Wehrverbände"

1) Period of independent organisation (Heimatschutz, Ostmärkische Sturmscharen, etc.).

2) Volunteer Guard (Freiwilliges Schutzkorps) organised by the Government in 1933, re-organised in June 1935.

3) Designation of the "Wehrverbände" whose members had the exclusive right to join the Volunteer Guard; June 1935.

4) Creation of a Front Militia, being a military organisation of the Patriotic Front; Second Law on the Patriotic Front; June 1936.

5) The Front Militia becomes an auxiliary force of the state executive; June 1936.

6) The members of the Volunteer Guard are taken over to the Front Militia; July 1936.

7) The "Wehrverbände" are dissolved. The Front Militia receives the monopoly of volunteer military organisation; the Front Militia has "to continue the tradition" of the "Wehrverbände"; October 15th, 1936.

E. General Compulsory Service

The Law of April 1st, 1936, and a number of subsequent Orders created the Compulsory Service for all Austrian male citizens from 18-42 years of age.

F. Youth Organisation

Creation of the Oesterreichische Jungvolk. Youth Law of January 1937 on the patriotic education of the youth. Youth meaning: boys and girls up to the age of 18. Separate organisation of the Catholic Youth.

V.

These measures show the reverse development of those of 1918 and the following years. While in the former period a constitution was constructed which lacked in a fundamental respect a basis in political reality, now the political reality develops first, partly in contradiction to the former written constitution, and then the laws are given which

fit the new development. A decisive political will to exist, and to exist in a definite way, is the primary fact which creates the adequate legal instrument to stabilise the new order. The political forces envisaged by the new legislation on matters of constitution are the forces which can be discerned in reality as the decisive forces of the Austrian government, while under the constitution of 1920 the principal political force envisaged by that instrument, the "people", did not exist in any relevant way, and the real political forces, the parties, had no place in the system of the written constitution.

The new infiltration of reality was brought about by events which have already been hinted at. In 1918 there was no good reason for an independent Austrian existence. As an economic unit, the country was cruelly maimed by the dismemberment of the old Monarchy, and the solution of all difficulties seemed to lie in the union with some bigger economic area. The national feeling was equally in favour of a union with the Reich; and the Socialist and Catholic parties did not object to a union with a country where the parallel parties exerted such considerable influence as the Socialdemocrats and the Zentrum in the Reich. – After the German Revolution of 1933 the situation had radically changed: only the national-Socialist minority was in favour of the "Anschluss"; the Socialist and Catholic parties could not any longer approve this policy after the experience of the sister-parties in the Reich. The two largest parties who commanded together in the parliament of 1933 80% of the votes had a new and very real interest in the independent existence of Austria. The smooth development of this favourable situation, however, was hampered by the difficulty that the Socialist party was prevented by its class-war ideology, its tradition, its anti-religious cultural ideals, and the accumulation of bitter feeling between the big parties during the years since 1918 from co-operating in the reconstruction of Austria in a satisfactory way – the short civil war of February 1934 exterminated the Socialist party and left the field to the Catholic force alone.

An entirely new type of political responsibility and morale was growing fast. The inclination towards non-existence was replaced by an Austrian "mission". While up to 1933 the independence was more or less forced upon Austria by the Treaty of St. Germain and the later

agreements "obliging" Austria to stay "independent", the independence now had become a necessity in order to pursue the realisation of certain political ideas. The national-socialist "Weltanschauung" with its totalitarian claim proved to be incompatible with the Catholic ideas of personality, society and humanity. The Austrian tradition of peaceful and tolerant administration acquired a new value when the neighbouring Great Power professed adherence to a form of government which demanded the restriction of personal rights in favour of the omnipotence of the community, the Volk, and the State. The Chancellor Dollfuss attached particular importance to the "authoritarian" quality of the new government as opposed to the totalitarian ideals. A movement made itself perceptible which endeavoured to clarify the particular qualities of the true Austrian (the "Oesterreichische Mensch") as the bearer of the new Austrian mission founded in a century-old tradition. The Austrian German was discovered to belong to that region of Europe which had developed under the influence of Mediterranean culture, while the Reich was said to be dominated by the German type which had not been imbued by the Latin spirit; – Austria was said to be the representative of the German Romanitas. And last not least, the monarchist movement which had no real meaning during the period when the idea of "Anschluss" was dominating the scene, gained in force, because if offered a reasonable solution for the problem of an Austrian independent political organisation and a safeguard against all projects of a "union".

VI.

The peculiar meaning of the Austrian idea of authoritarianism cannot be grasped adequately unless it is considered in relation to the idea of corporative organisation. The idea to organise the people on professional lines is an old one in the history of Parliamentarism. Since the 50's of the last century programmes have sprung up in the United States (Calhoun), England (Grey) and France (Renan) with the intention to reform Parliament in order to make it technically a

working instrument of government under the new conditions of mass-democracy. To avoid domination over groups of important social function, but small in number, by the large masses of petty-bourgeois and industrial workers, Parliament should be organised – in the general sense of such reformers – according to professional and other functional groups giving proper weight to each group irrespective of its size; this measure should preserve the influence of small groups, who, otherwise, would have been annihilated politically by the masses. The "corporative state" is, in this respect, a technical measure to paralyse certain disadvantages of mass-democracy.

Another incentive to corporative ideas comes from the social field. The Marxist ideology of class-war furthered by way of reaction the project of associations comprising industrialists and workers in once social unit. This idea goes back to the end of the last century, and has been fostered in Austria particularly by the Vogelsang group.

A third element may be found in the idea that the "economic interests" should participate in the government of a nation and perhaps replace the "political" representation. This idea has its foundation in an exaggerated opinion of the brain questions of economic "leaders" as compared with those of politicians, and more generally in a trend to consider the "specialist" as the proper type of man to handle difficult social problems. The idea expressed itself in the movement of "Economic Councils" which should form part of the governmental organisation of a State (German Reich, France). In Austria this movement can be recognised since the constitutional era of 1918 and 1920.

And ultimately, and for Austria very important, the organisation of professional corporations corresponds to the Catholic social ideas on the subsidiary function of larger communities. The larger community, the State, should intervene only when the means of smaller social units did not suffice for their end. The organisation of smaller social units with certain autonomy is one of the postulates of the Encyclic Quadragesimo Anno (1931) – which, for the rest, expresses the idea of social pacification and determination of class-war ideology as well.

All these factual and ideological motives together have been causes of the Austrian corporative organisation. A corporative organisation of the people, and a representation of the people on the lines of professional and other functional interests has a technical consequence which had not been taken into account by the reformers of the 19th century, which, however, has been seen already quite clearly by a statesman like Seipel (and also by French teachers of public law like Hauriou and the Institutionalist school). A representation of economic and other functional interests can never be a political representation of a people. It is a system of private interests and not an organisation of the <u>res publica</u> as a political unit. A representation of interests can work without destroying the State only when a political authority is organised which will paralyse and counterbalance the centrifugal tendencies of private interests and works as the representation of the will of the people as a whole. A corporative representation requires a political authority as its technical counterpart in the governmental organisation of a country.

This technical necessity of an authoritarian government seems to develop into the essential contents of Austrian authoritarianism. The problem is perhaps not yet seen quite clearly; – at least, the Second Law on the Patriotic Front (May 1936) has still created a Leader's Council, consisting of 40 members, whereof 14 are representatives of the corporations. But it has already been realised in certain governmental circles that the organisation of this Council gives rise to misgivings. The Patriotic Front is destined to be the political organisation of all citizens and it should, therefore, be organised on the lines of the general political interests of the people and not incorporate representatives of particular economic interest. It will probably, sooner or later, become necessary to clarify the situation and to separate technically the lines of representation necessitated by the corporative organisation of the State.

VII.

I have given a very general outline, in a wood-cut fashion, of the technical problems of Austrian reorganisation. But I hope that the decisive changes in the ideas of government and constitution have become clear, and also their practical import for the problem of Peaceful Change, as far as Austria is concerned. While up to 1933 Austria was "forced" to be "independent", while no political people did exist in a relevant way on the Austrian territory, and, therefore, Austria was a danger-spot in the sense that changes in the map of Europe of tremendous consequences have been imminent because of Austria's will to non-existence, since 1933 the situation has changed considerably. It would be an exaggeration to say that now an Austrian people exists in a most satisfactory way – but certainly it is now in the making. The unpolitical, administrative attitude, and the atmosphere of exploitation by the parties has been dissolved; a consciousness of the political necessities is developing rapidly. With the parties the private armies have disappeared, and a Front Militia and the General Compulsory Service have taken their place. A youth-organisation is developing. And insight into the peculiar political problems of a corporative State is growing. From the point of view of domestic politics a not entirely peaceful but certainly a change has taken place, which is now rapidly making for the consolidation of a political unit. From the point of view of foreign politics, this consolidation removes the danger of the inclination of a State in Central Europe from the map, with all the consequences which might ensue.

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